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ABSTRACT
The Development of Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment in Oil/Gas and
Chemical Industries. (May 2010)
Xiaole Yang, B.S., Tianjin University of Science & Technology
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mahboobul Mannan
In oil/gas and chemical industries, dynamics is one of the most essential charac-
teristics of any process. Time-dependent response is involved in most steps of both
the physical/engineering processes and the equipment performance. The conventional
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is unable to address the time dependent eect
in such dynamic processes. In this dissertation, a methodology of Dynamic Opera-
tional Risk Assessment (DORA) is developed for operational risk analysis in oil/gas
and chemical industries. Given the assumption that the component performance state
determines the value of parameters in process dynamics equations, the DORA prob-
abilistic modeling integrates stochastic modeling and process dynamics modeling to
evaluate operational risk. The stochastic system-state trajectory is modeled based on
the abnormal behavior or failure of the components. For each of the possible system-
state trajectories, a process dynamics evaluation is carried out to check whether
process variables, e.g., level, ow rate, temperature, pressure, or chemical concen-
tration, remain in their desirable regions. Monte Carlo simulations are performed to
calculate the probability of process variable exceeding the safety boundaries. Compo-
nent testing/inspection intervals and repair time are critical parameters to dene the
system-state conguration; and play an important role for evaluating the probability
of operational failure. Sensitivity analysis is suggested to assist selecting the DORA
iv
probabilistic modeling inputs. In this study, probabilistic approach to characterize
uncertainty associated with QRA is proposed to analyze data and experiment results
in order to enhance the understanding of uncertainty and improve the accuracy of
the risk estimation. Dierent scenarios on an oil/gas separation system were used
to demonstrate the application of DORA method, and approaches are proposed for
sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. Case study on a knockout drum in the distilla-
tion unit of a renery process shows that the epistemic uncertainty associated with
the risk estimation is reduced through Bayesian updating of the generic reliability
information using plant specic real time testing or reliability data. Case study on
an oil/gas separator component inspection interval optimization illustrates the cost-
benet analysis in DORA framework and how DORA probabilistic modeling can be
used as a tool for decision making. DORA not only provides a framework to evalu-
ate the dynamic operational risk in oil/gas and chemical industries, but also guides
the process design and optimization of the critical parameters such as component
inspection intervals.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Oshore oil/gas operations and chemical process activities receive a great deal of
public awareness and concern regarding their potential hazardous impact on people,
environment and society. The oshore plants typically involve a number of stages of
oil, gas and water separation, gas compression, and dehydration. Process operation,
together with transportation and drilling operation, are the most hazardous activities
on an oshore oil and gas platform[1]. A small mishap in the process operation might
escalate to a catastrophic event due to the limited space, compact geometry of the
process area, less ventilation, and dicult escape routes. The risk associated with
a typical oshore installation may be categorized into: process risk, dropped object
risk, structural failure risk, helicopter accident risk, and ship collision risk. Process
risk, which is dened as the risk due to re and explosion in the process facility,
contributes more than 50% of the total risk of the oshore installation[2]. In chemical
plants, processes involve activities including mixing, separation, high pressure and/or
high temperature operation, reactive chemical reaction, etc. Mechanical hazards can
cause worker injuries from tripping, falling, or moving equipment. Fire and explosion
hazards, as well as reactivity hazards and toxic hazards are also signicant in chemical
plants.
Case histories show that incidents in oil/gas and chemical industries usually cause
signicant casualties and unbearable economic loss. For example, the Flixborough
disaster, which occurred in a chemical plant that produced caprolactam, a precursor
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2chemical used in the manufacture of nylon, in Flixborough, England, on June 1, 1974,
killed 28 people and seriously injured 36[3]. The Bhopal disaster[3] took place at a
Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, on December 3, 1984. The incident
released methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas, exposing more than 500,000 people to MIC
and other chemicals. It killed at least 3,800 people and caused signicant morbidity
and premature death for many thousands more. An explosion and resulting re in
the Piper Alpha disaster[4] destroyed the oil production platform on July 6, 1988,
killing 167 people, and the total insured loss was $3.4 billion. A massive explosion in
a high-density polyethylene plant in Pasadena, Texas, on October 23, 1989, killed 23
people, injured 314, and resulted in over $715 million capital losses[3]. In the recent
past years, several oshore and renery disasters have occurred. On March 23, 2005,
a series of explosions occurred during the startup of the hydrocarbon isomerization
unit at BP Texas City renery killing 15 people, injuring 180 others and resulting in
$1.5 billion losses[5]. On July 26, 2005, a re at India's largest oil and gas platform
Mumbai High North Platform, completely destroyed the platform and caused 22
fatalities[6].
All these accidents had a signicant impact on public perceptions and the chem-
ical engineering profession. Concerns to add new emphasis and standards in the
practice of safety have been translated into federal or state regulations. For exam-
ple, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety
Management (PSM) standard, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Risk
Management Program (RMP), Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society's
(ISA) Safety Instrumented System (SIS) related standards: ISA-S84.01 and Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission's (IEC) IEC61508, and other federal regulations
are dedicated to process safety[3].
The investigation on most of the major accidents shows that those tragedies
3could be avoided with eective risk analysis and safety management programs. Risk
assessment approaches need to be consistently improved for better risk analysis and
safety management. Development of Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment (DORA)
methodology for oil/gas and chemical industries is the subject matter of this doctoral
dissertation. Principal problems, research objectives, research contributions of the
present work and the organization of the dissertation are presented in this Chapter
together with the necessary introductory materials. In Section B, a brief description
of the principal problem is presented. The dynamic concerns in Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) dene the objectives of this work, which are presented in Section
C. In the subsequent sections, the contributions of the work and the organization of
the dissertation are described.
B. Problem Statement
The oil/gas and chemical process systems exhibit complicated and dynamic be-
havior. Various time-dependent eects such as season changes, aging of process equip-
ment, physical processes, stochastic processes, operator response time, etc. are in-
volved in such dynamic processes. With the accumulated experience of QRA and the
progressive awareness of dynamic characteristics of reliability and safety, conventional
approaches that are static reveal their weakness in nature when applied to dynamic
processes[7, 8]. For instance, fault tree/event tree analysis (FTA/ETA)[9], initially
applied in nuclear power plants, collects a set of logical expressions to represent static
relationship between a component output event and component failure or another
component output event in the process system. FTA is a good implementation tool
using logic to identify output deviations due to input deviations or internal failures,
but overlooks the system dynamic response to time, process variables, and human
4behavior[10]. FTA/ETA methods often used on a static basis consider only the ma-
jor incidents or accidents but ignore minor incidents, abnormal events or near misses.
Similarly, the conventional reliability assessment without profound understanding of
the dynamics of both physical process and system performance is insucient to help
understand the operational risk that may trigger catastrophe when the critical process
variables exceed their safety boundaries without being detected. Those conventional
risk and reliability assessment methods fail to capture the variation of operational
risks as time-dependent deviations or changes in the process take place.
In oil/gas and chemical processes, operation conditions, such as separation, high-
pressure compression, storage, desulphurization, and blending, are vulnerable to es-
calate small mishaps into catastrophe. Abnormal events that are called accident pre-
cursors may result in incidents and near misses during the life of process. Protection
systems are designed to monitor the process variables and take appropriate action
if any or a combination of them exceed a predetermined desirable region. However,
those protection systems may provide false or misleading information. The failure
of this class of protection system becomes signicant if it coincides with a deviation
of the monitored parameters. For example, investigation on the BP Texas City in-
cident found that the level transmitter indicated the level in the spliting tower was
declining gradually but the level was actually rising during the startup. The level
indicator read 7.9 feet in the tower; however, the tower level was actually 158 feet[5].
It is not experimentally practical to replicate such catastrophic events to evaluate
the operational incident probability. Therefore, a new simulation tool for dynamic
operational risk assessment is needed to assess the probability of operational incidents
that potentially lead to a catastrophe.
5C. Research Objective
The main objective is to develop a practical and systematic risk assessment
method starting from conceptual design to mathematical modeling then to optimal
resource allocation solutions. This methodology will improve understanding of the
operational risk associated with dynamic processes in oil/gas and chemical industries.
The objective is achieved through the following phases:
Phase I:
 Design the conceptual framework of DORA that can be generically applied to
any dynamic process in oil/gas and chemical industries.
 Develop mathematical models for the dynamic risk assessment for oil/gas and
chemical processes. Those models should be able to characterize the process
dynamics governed by laws of physics and engineering and also the dynamics
driven by the equipment performance and deterioration.
Phase II:
 Design algorithms to solve the mathematical models integrating discrete event
simulation, process dynamics simulation and Monte Carlo simulation.
 Implement the algorithms and subsequent programming to a practical process.
Phase III:
 Establish a probabilistic approach to evaluate the quality of a QRA study. This
approach should be able to characterize the uncertainty associated with risk
analysis.
6 Develop uncertainty reduction strategies to improve QRA study.
Phase IV:
 Optimize the resource allocation for risk reduction in the case study used in
Phase II.
D. Research Contributions
Hazard identication, hazard assessment and risk estimation are key aspects in
oil/gas and chemical process plant design and operation. One of the most important
contributions of this research is to introduce a new simulation-base dynamic opera-
tional risk assessment approach to oil/gas and chemical industries and illustrated by
case studies. Dierent from the conventional QRA approaches and other dynamic
risk assessment tools, this research provides industries with:
 A systematic approach, DORA, for operational risk estimation.
 A prediction tool targeting the component/system abnormal events, also re-
ferred to as accident precursors. Accident precursors are considered so that this
tool is able to prevent a failure from actually occurring. DORA methodology is
applicable to scenarios with either system shutdown due to component failure
or system remaining in process in the presence of component abnormal events.
 Monitoring on the simultaneous failure/abnormal events of multiple compo-
nents using the stochastic simulation in DORA framework. The system-state
trajectory is simulated upon Monte Carlo sampling from the distribution of
stochastic variables.
 Characterization of the system state trajectory considering critical parameters
in reliability and safety engineering, such as component inspection interval,
7maintenance time, testing time, repair time, etc. Component states are not
limited to only up and down to study the system stochastic behavior. Test-
ing/inspection intervals and component repair times are important parameters
to dene the component states. It provides insights for testing/inspection in-
terval optimization.
In the design phase of an oil/gas or chemical process or plant, DORA aids opera-
tional hazard identication and hazard assessment. Operational failure scenarios will
be identied in order to recommend improvement in design for risk reduction. Mean-
while, DORA provides a risk measurement using a standard computational space
storage and time consumption to assist evaluating the competing control system or
safety system designs. In operation phase, implementing resource optimization pro-
posed in DORA assists decision making on cost-eective inspection or test scheduling.
This framework is implemented as an ongoing model to guide implementation and
continual updating of safety program components such as risk-based and cost-eective
monitoring, testing, maintenance, reliability assessment, component replacement tim-
ing, shutdown times, and timing of other operational decisions including selection of
minimal reliability criteria during maintenance shutdowns.
E. Organization of This Dissertation
Following this introduction Chapter, three independent Chapters will explain the
Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment (DORA) methodology, uncertainty character-
ization and reduction in QRA, and component inspection interval optimization. In
Chapter II the author explains the development of DORA framework, including the
steps of Scope Identication and System Description, Hazard Identication, Scenario
Identication, Component Failure Mode Identication, DORA Probabilistic Modeling,
8Incident Consequence Modeling, Risk Determination, Modication on the Design or
Operation, Cost-Benet Analysis, and Build and/or Operate the System. The focus
of the quantitative analysis is the development of DORA Probabilistic Modeling and
the uncertainty characterization in Incident Consequence Modeling. Chapter III ex-
plores dierent types of uncertainty associated with a QRA, how to characterize the
uncertainty in a fault tree analysis, and how to reduce epistemic uncertainty through
Bayesian updating the reliability information of a system using real life reliability
data or equipment testing data. Chapter IV extends the case study in Chapter II
and optimizes the component inspection interval using multiobjective optimization
approaches. Dierent multiobjective optimization techniques are introduced and two
of them are applied in the case study. Chapters II through IV have their own intro-
duction, literature review, body, and summary. The information in each chapter is
relative but self-contained, Chapter V provides an overall summary of the conclusions
and recommendations, followed by the Section of References. Other supplementary
data are summarized in the Appendix.
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DORA METHODOLOGY
A. Introduction
A methodology of Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment (DORA) is proposed
for operational risk analysis in oil/gas and chemical industries. In this Chapter,
DORA methodology will be introduced comprehensively starting from the conceptual
framework design to mathematical modeling and to decision making based on cost-
benet analysis. The probabilistic modeling part of DORA integrates stochastic
modeling and process dynamics modeling to evaluate operational incident probability.
The stochastic system-state trajectory is modeled according to the abnormal behavior
or failure of each component in the system. For each of the possible system-state
trajectories, a process dynamics evaluation is carried out to check whether process
variables, e.g., level, ow rate, temperature, pressure, or chemical concentration,
remain in their desirable regions. DORA methodology not only provides a framework
to evaluate the dynamic operational risk in oil/gas and chemical industries, but also
guides the process design and further optimization. Chapter II explores the literature
on QRA in oil/gas and chemical industries as well as research in the dynamic risk
assessment eld, and explains the DORA framework development in detail. The
main objective of this Chapter is to provide a general framework of DORA and
the development of DORA probabilistic modeling. A case study on level control
in an oil/gas separator will be used to illustrate the incident probabilistic modeling.
Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from "An Uncertainty and Sen-
sitivity Analysis of Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment Model: A Case Study." by
Xiaole Yang and M. Sam Mannan, 2010. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 300-307, Copyright[2010] by Elsevier.
10
Sensitivity analysis will be performed to evaluate the importance of selection of model
input distribution type in the DORA case study.
B. Literature Review
Risk is a measure of the potential loss, such as loss of human life, adverse health
eects, loss of property, environmental damage, and economic loss, etc, due to nat-
ural or human activities[11]. Risk analysis is the process that involves a series of
activities including characterizing, managing, and informing others about the exis-
tence, nature, magnitude, prevalence, contributing factors, and uncertainties of the
potential losses[11]. Risk analysis has three core elements: risk assessment, risk man-
agement, and risk communication[12]. In risk assessment, three basic questions posed
by Kaplan and Garrick include[13]:
 What can go wrong?
 How likely is it?
 What are the losses (consequences)?
Both qualitative and quantitative techniques can be used to address those ques-
tions. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is preferred when adequate data and
other evidences exist to estimate the probability and magnitude of the losses, and is
required early in the project life cycle for major risk contributors identication and
assessment[14].
QRA has been widely used in oil/gas and chemical industries; it dates back to
the 1970s. The US 'Reactor Safety Study'[9], a project conducted for research and
development purpose in 1975, investigated the availability of analysis methodologies
and sucient sophistication and robustness of data. Classical QRA approach such
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as Fault Tree Analysis(FTA) studied in this research is still widely used nowadays.
FTA was rst developed in 1961 at Bell Telephone Laboratories for a missile launch
control reliability study during the Polaris project. It was extensively used in relia-
bility studies in the nuclear and aerospace industries, and also adapted to chemical
process industries. In 1981, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate(NPD) issued their
guidelines for safety evaluation of platform conceptual design[15]. QRA is required
in these guidelines for all new oshore installations in the conceptual design phase
in Norway. An ecient methodology was established and subsequently extended to
application on existing installations. Ten years later, these NPD guidelines were re-
placed by regulations for the use and execution of risk analysis in 1991[16]. QRA
became an ocial requirement for oshore after the Piper Alpha platform disaster
that took place in 1988. Lord Cullen in his report recommended QRA as a technique
to provide a structured, objective and quantitative approach to understanding risks
and of the means to control them[17].
More extensive studies have also emerged since 1992 UK Safety Case Legislation
required the use of oshore risk analysis in industry in the UK to be a part of the
safety cases for existing and new installations. Vinnem[18] summarized the devel-
opment of QRA in the oshore oil and gas industry for the last 20 years, since the
research activities in the North Sea. Crawley and Grant[19] proposed a screening
tool for oshore risk assessment that permits the risk assessment of design options
in a methodical, consistent and auditable manner. The goal of this tool is to reduce
front-end design costs and target design eorts in a cost-eective and safety-oriented
manner. The application of QRA in design on modern oshore platform was discussed
by Falck et al.[20]. Work methodology, selection of tools and data, and organization of
QRA with other activities were addressed in this study. Rettedal et al.[21] proposed
a method integrating QRA and SRA(structural reliability analysis) in a Bayesian
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framework for risk measurement in marine operation. Two examples show that the
integration of SRA with 'fully Bayesian approach' is better than the integration with
'classical Bayesian approach'. QRA models for oil tankers were developed by Cross
and Ballesio[22]. QRA is used in this study as a tool to evaluate competing designs,
the relative benets of redundancy, and the impact of equipment unavailability during
operations. QRA study for loading and uploading facilities in marine hydrocarbon
terminals sited in ports was published by Ronza et al.[23]. A number of studies on
consequence analysis for oshore and chemical processes have been published. De
Leon and Ortega presented an indirect losses calculation for an oshore oil com-
plex in Mexico[24]. Explosion recurrence modeling has been studied by Yasseri and
Prager[25]. A revised re consequence model for oshore was developed by Pula et
al.[26].
The review by Siu regarding the research on reliability and safety assessment of
dynamic process systems is an important summary of the work already performed
in this eld of study[27]. The rst Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA)
approach was DYLAM, proposed by Amendola[28] to study the likelihood of accident
sequences in a nuclear reactor. The DYLAM method couples the probabilistic and
physical behavior of a system for a reliability analysis. Numerical simulation is con-
ducted to study the physical system where the components are modeled in dierent
working states: nominal, failed on, failed o, stuck, etc. DYLAM is designed to fol-
low all the paths resulting from dierent component working state transitions and to
drive the corresponding physical process simulation. The probability of occurrence
of a certain top event is obtained by adding the probability of the corresponding se-
quences. The applications of DYLAM, DYLAM-3, and DYLAM-TRETA have been
published[29, 30, 31, 32, 33].
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Upgrades in the conventional event tree analysis for dynamics concern have re-
sulted in two alternate groups of methods: Continuous Dynamic Event Tree (C-
DET)[34] and Discrete Dynamic Event Tree (D-DET)[35]. Which method is used
is dependent on how the branching times are selected. Monte Carlo sampling from
the distribution of stochastic variables is the basis for event time selection in the
C-DET approach, whereas branching time selection in the D-DET approach follows
a set of rules, such as a discrete approximation of the corresponding C-DET[36].
Computer code, MSAS (Monte Carlo Simulation for Accident Sequences)[37], is de-
signed to implement C-DET; and codes DYLAM[28], DETAM[38], as well as ADS[36],
are designed for D-DET. In some of the approaches above, Monte Carlo techniques
have been applied as an important tool in reliability assessment for dynamic pro-
cess systems. A simulation-based approach proposed by Deoss [39] uses Monte Carlo
techniques for introducing failures in time. A general theory to describe the determin-
istic and stochastic nature of incident events proposed by Smidts and Devooght[40]
employs Monte Carlo techniques to study a fast reactor transit. A Monte Carlo dy-
namic approach to reliability was proposed by Marseguerra and Zio[41] and compared
to classic static analysis.
Markov theory[42] is applicable to describe the stochastic behavior of a chemical
process if it has Markov property:
 The system can be specied at any time by dening its process state at the
time being; the system can be in any of a nite number of states.
 The conditional distribution of any future state given the past states and the
present state, is independent of the past states and only depends on the present
state.
 The individual Markov transition diagrams are mutually exclusive.
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 Time at the transition from one state to another is independent and an expo-
nentially distributed random variable. In a semi-Markov process, the restriction
of exponential distribution type is removed.
 Transition probability from the instant state to itself is zero.
Let Xn 2 < denote a nite number of possible instant states of the process.
When Xn = i, it says the component is the process in state i at time n. At the state
of i, the probability of the process will next be in state j, Pij is given by:
Pij = P fXn+1 = jjXn = i;Xn 1 = in 1; : : : ; X1 = i1; X0 = i0g (2.1)
for all states i0, i1,. . . , in 1, i, j and all n  0. This process is known as Markov chain.
For a Markov chain, given the past states and the present state, the future states are
only dependent on the present state, but independent of the past states, regardless of
the whole state evolution process. An important assumption of its application is that
the time at the transition from one state to another is an exponentially distributed
random variable. Semi-Markov process is a generalization of the Markov and renewal
process, which is not restricted to exponential distribution on the sojourn time. The
evolution of the semi-Markovian process in time is an increasing sequence of random
variables:
0 = T0  T1  T2  : : :  Tn  : : : (2.2)
with value in [0;1) and this random variable Tn is the time that the nth transit
occurs when n  1. So if Xn = j, Tn+1   Tn is the random length of the episode in
state j. The state (Xn; Tn) has the semi-Markov property if
15
P [Xn+1 = j; Tn+1   Tn  tj (Xk; Tk; k = 0; 1; : : : ; n)] (2.3)
= P [Xn+1 = j; Tn+1   Tn  tjXn = i] (2.4)
for all n = 0; 1; 2; : : :, and t  0.
Furthermore, the right side of equation 2.4 can be written in terms of the distri-
bution function of the episode time Fij (x):
P [Xn+1 = j; Tn+1   Tn  tjXn = i] = pijFij (x) (2.5)
where pij = P [Xn+1 = jjXn = i].
Unlike the forward Kolmogorov dierential equations in continuous time Markov
jump processes, Markov renewal integral equations play a fundamental role in semi-
Markov process analysis. Markov renewal equation is dened as:
Pij (t) = Dij (t)
X
k 6=j
Z t
0
Qik (s)Pkj (t  s) ds (2.6)
where Pij is an unknown matrix-valued function, and Dij is a known matrix-value
function. The process enters state k at some point s 2 (0; t] before entering state j.
This equation can be written in the following form by using convolution :
P = D +Q  P (2.7)
Blin et al.[43] discussed the use of Markov processes for reliability problems. Pa-
pazoglou presented the elements of Markovian reliability analysis [44] and discussed
the need of Markovian reliability analysis[8]. Aldemir[45] proposed a computer as-
sisted Markov failure modeling for process control systems with control loops and
continuous state dynamic variables. Markov models were used to describe the proba-
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bilistic evolution of the controlled variables in discrete time and discretized controlled
variable state space in a data base oriented method for closed loop control systems
by Hassan and Aldemir[46]. A mathematical formulation of probabilistic dynamics
was adapted to dynamic process analysis[47]. The mixed probabilistic and deter-
ministic dynamics formulation involves process variables, semi-Markovian process of
the system transition, and human error modeling. Papazoglou and Gyftopoulos ap-
plied Markovian reliability analysis on a shutdown system of the clinch river breeder
reactor[48]. Other approximate application of the Markovian method can be found
in several publications[49, 50, 51].
C. DORA Framework
The conceptual framework of DORA is shown in Figure 1. The detailed approach
of each step and the algorithm associated if any will be discussed in rest of the section.
1. Scope Identication and System Description
Scope Identication and System Description plays an important role in DORA
as a foundation and starting point for further hazard identication and mathematical
model development. The scope of a DORA project has to be dened for the study
to be better managed, controlled, veried, and communicated to the stakeholders
or customers. According to the demand of the stakeholders/customers, the analysis
scope varies from a small scale of system, for instance a liquid storage tank, to a
middle size of system, say, a cracker unit, to a large scale of system (perhaps the whole
renery plant) and so forth. Regardless of the size of the study scope, the system will
be broken down into several subsystems, further components. Each component or a
group of components within the same subsystem has its own fashion of failure mode.
17
Fig. 1. DORA methodology scheme.
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Fig. 2. A liquid storage tank.
For example, a liquid storage tank as shown in Figure 2[52] can be separated into
two components as pump system and valve. The distribution of failure probability of
this storage tank system can be used as a subsystem input when the study scope is
enlarged.
2. Hazard Identication
Generally, hazard identication by itself can be performed at any stage dur-
ing the initial design or ongoing operation of a process. However, it is required to
be performed before the mathematical modeling for probabilistic safety analysis in
the DORA framework. The DORA mathematical modeling is scenario and failure
mode specic. And Hazard Identication is the step directing to the discovery of
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the scenario and component failure mode. Therefore, Hazard Identication and the
subsequent Scenario Identication and Component Failure Mode Identication steps
are necessary in the early stage of the operational risk assessment in a DORA study.
The hazard identication methods for DORA are adapted from general hazard iden-
tication.
 Hazards Checklists
A hazards checklist is simply a list of all the possible problems to be checked.
This list reminds the operator, reviewer, or risk analyst of the potential haz-
ardous areas. Checklists are suggested to be applied only during the preliminary
stages of hazard identication and should not be used as a replacement for a
more complete hazard identication procedure. A typical process safety check-
list might contain the following items[53]:
{ Consequences of exposure to adjacent operations considered?
{ Special fume or dust hoods required?
{ Process laboratory checked for runaway explosive conditions?
{ Provisions for protection from explosions?
{ Hazardous reactions possible due to mistakes or contaminations?
{ Provisions for rapid disposal of reactants in an emergency?
{ Failure of mechanical equipment possible cause of hazards?
{ Hazards possible from gradual or sudden blockages in piping or equipment?
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 Hazards Surveys
A hazard survey can be one of the two popular forms: the Dow Fire and Ex-
plosion Index (F&EI)[54] and the Dow-Chemical Exposure Index (CEI)[55]. It
also could be simple as an inventory of hazardous materials in a facility. F&EI
and CEI are two formal systematic approaches using a rating form to provide
a relative ranking of the hazard. The steps and application of F&EI and CEI
forms can be found in AIChE's publications[54, 55]. Hazards survey approach
is suitable for hazard identication associated with equipment design, layout,
material storage, etc., but improper for operation or upset conditions.
 Hazard and Operability Studies
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a formal procedure of hazard
identication in a chemical process facility. A multi-disciplinary HAZOP team is
required to be led by a faciliator who is experienced with the HAZOP procedure
and the chemical process under review. It is a qualitative technique based on
guide-words. The HAZOP procedure includes the following steps[56, 3]:
1. Break a detailed ow sheet into a number of process units. Select one for
study.
2. Identify a study node.
3. Describe the design intent of the study node.
4. Choose a process parameter, e.g., temperature, pressure, pH, level, ow,
viscosity, and so forth.
5. Apply a guide word to the process parameter to suggest possible deviations.
6. Determine the possible causes and note any protective systems if the de-
viation is applicable.
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7. Evaluate the consequences of the deviation if any.
8. Recommend action.
9. Record information.
10. Repeat steps 5 through 9 until all applicable guide words have been applied
to the chosen process parameter.
11. Repeat steps 4 through 10 until all applicable process parameters have
been considered for the predetermined study node.
12. Repeat steps 2 through 11 until all study nodes have been considered for
the given section and proceed to the next one on the ow sheet.
 Safety Reviews
A safety review is used to identify safety problems in laboratory and process
areas. Solutions are then developed in the review for signicant improvement.
Usually, a formal safety review is for new processes, substantial changes in
existing processes, and processes that need an updated review. However, an
informal safety review is for small changes to existing processes and small bench
scale or laboratory processes.
 What-If
This is a structured brainstorming method of determining what can go wrong
in an operation process by asking questions starting from 'what-if. . . '. Those
questions could be relative to human errors, process upsets, and equipment
failures. The errors and failures considered can be in the situation of normal
operations, under construction, during maintenance activities, etc.
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3. Scenario Identication
There could be several scenarios that lead to the same consequence in a process.
For example, for re hazard in a fuel storage tank system, multiple scenarios might be
identied as the direct causes coincided with an ignition source: overow of the storage
tank, leakage at the tank bottom, leakage at piping, etc. The process dynamics
modeling and incident consequence analysis are scenario specic. In each scenario,
a unique dynamics model is developed to characterize the physical features of the
process. Probabilities of hazardous scenarios are the outputs of DORA Probabilistic
Modeling that will be discussed in subsection 6.
4. Component Failure Mode Identication
It is important to identify the component failure mode in a DORA study. The
reasons are:
Firstly, any scenario identied in the third step has resulted from certain compo-
nent failures or abnormal events. In this study, we will use the term 'failure mode' for
both actual equipment failure mode and abnormal event mode. An explicit DORA
study is dependent on identifying all the possible hazards, scenarios and component
failure mode combinations. There are usually multiple components in the same sys-
tem. Dierent component failure mode combinations could lead to the same scenario.
The relationship among Scope Identication and System Description, Hazard Identi-
cation, Scenario Identication, and Component Failure Mode Identication is shown
in Figure 3. For any one of the a hazards identied, there are b scenarios needing to
be analyzed. In each of the b scenarios, there could be c possible component failure
mode combinations driving the scenario. Therefore, in the system under review, there
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Fig. 3. The relationship among Scope Identication and System Description, Hazard
Identication, Scenario Identication, and Component Failure Mode Identi-
cation.
will be total number of U system performance modelings and the associated DORA
probabilistic modelings required:
U = c  b  a (2.8)
Secondly, this step is the tunnel between the previous qualitative steps and the
following quantitative assessment steps. The reliability data needed for further sys-
tem performance analysis is failure mode specic. For the same piece of equipment,
reliability data for dierent failure modes are totally dierent. The component failure
mode identication will determine what component reliability data to be used as the
input of the quantitative analysis steps(Figure 4).
5. DORA Probabilistic Modeling
DORA probabilistic modeling integrates process dynamics modeling and stochas-
tic modeling to analyze the behavior of process variables in the presence of component
failure/abnormal event. The evolution of incidental sequences in a process system is a
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Fig. 4. The connection between qualitative steps and quantitative steps in a DORA
study through Component Failure Mode Identication.
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combination of deterministic and stochastic events. The physical behavior of a process
is a set of deterministic events; and the system component performance determines
the stochastic events. The linkage between the two is that the stochastic system-state
trajectory is the driven force of the process physical variable trajectory. In this subsec-
tion, attention is conned to developing a systematic DORA probabilistic modeling
for computing the probability of process variables exceeding the operational safety
boundaries using considerable computational space storage and time consumption.
a. System-state Trajectory Modeling
The system-state trajectory modeling is designed to model the system perfor-
mance. Discrete event simulation is the foundation of developing the system-state
trajectory modeling. In discrete-event simulation, a chronological sequence of events
represent the operation of a system in which each event occurs at an instant in time
and marks a change of system-state[57]. Terminologies are stated as the following for
the discrete event simulation:
Component : Any equipment, instrument, hardware or software, etc., composing
the system that is under assessment. For example, a pump, a valve, a vessel, an
alarm, etc. They are the smallest physical units in the DORA modeling construction.
Component-state: Each of the components can be specied at any time by den-
ing its performance behavior state at that time. A component can be in any of a nite
number of states. In this study, a component visits one of the three states indicat-
ing their instantaneous performance status, which are Normal Operating, Abnormal
Event Undetected, and Abnormal Event Detected and Under Repair. The transition
of component states follows a certain direction(Figure 5). Prior to each assessment,
the component failure mode has to be dened to locate the corresponding failure rate
or abnormal event rate data. At any instant, any component is only able to remain
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Fig. 5. Component states ow diagram.
in a unique state.
System-state: a combination of component states to describe the system behavior
at the time being. If there are N components within a system, through A, B, . . . , to
N , the total number of possible system state, M , is given by:
M = 3N (2.9)
The system-state trajectory is a sequence of part or all of the M system states.
Sojourn time: a random variable to represent the time a component or system
spends in a state. By probabilistic law, the sojourn time follows a certain type of
distribution. The parameters of those distributions are specic in each case.
Process variable: variables that are used to describe the physical dynamics of
the system process, for instance, temperature in the reactor, pressure in the vessel,
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level in the storage tank, etc. We use a vector x to denote a set of process variables
of interest.
The rst step in system-state trajectory simulation is to characterize the compo-
nent state sojourn time distribution. The component-state sojourn time is the time a
component spends in a specic state. For State 1 of a component, Normal Operating,
the sojourn time is dened as the time between failures or abnormal event occur-
rences. Let random variable, X, denote the length of an episode between failures or
abnormal event occurrences. In reliability engineering, a common assumption is that
the time between failures is an exponentially distributed random variable. The expo-
nential distribution assumption is also applicable in this study. Therefore, X follows
an exponential distribution. The parameter(s) for the distribution of X depend on
the failure rate or abnormal event rate. The probability density function of State 1
sojourn time distribution is given by:
f(x;) = e x (2.10)
The time a component remains in State 2, Abnormal Event Undetected, is dened
as the time between an abnormal event occurs without being detected and the ab-
normal event detected through testing or inspection. The sojourn time at this state
is determined by both the failure rate or abnormal event rate and the component
testing/inspection interval. Let random variable, Y , denote the length of an episode
in component State 2. The relationship among X, Y , and the testing/inspection
interval T is demonstrated in Figure 6. An important assumption for the problem
formulation is that the testing/inspection interval T is a constant. The probability
distribution function of Y is given by:
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Fig. 6. The relationship among component State 1 sojourn time(X, the empty bars),
component State 2 sojourn time(Y , the bold bars), and the testing/inspection
interval(T ) along time axis.
P (Y < y) = P (T  X < yjX < T )P (X < T )
+P (2T  X < yjT < X < 2T )P (T < X < 2T )
+P (3T  X < yj2T < X < 3T )P (2T < X < 3T ) +    (2.11)
This is equivalent to:
P (Y < y) = P (X > T   yjX < T )P (X < T )
+P (X > 2T   yjT < X < 2T )P (T < X < 2T )
+P (X > 2T   yj2T < X < 3T )P (2T < X < 3T ) +    (2.12)
Using conditional probability law:
P

A
\
B

= P (B)P (AjB) (2.13)
Equation 2.12 is simplied as:
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P (Y < y) = P (T   y < X < T )+P (2T   y < X < 2T )+P (3T   y < X < 3T )+  
(2.14)
According to the equation of distribution probability density function ofX (equa-
tion 2.10), and equation 2.14, the probability distribution function of Y is given by:
P (Y < y) =
e (T y)   e T
1  e T (2.15)
The sojourn time distribution of component State 3, Abnormal Event Detected
and Under Repair, is obtained by tting appropriate distributions to industry data.
The industry data is in the form of recorded labor hours to repair the components.
Exponential distribution, gamma distribution, lognormal distribution and Weibull
distribution are suggested for the tting as they are the four widely used distribution
types to describe the time to repair in reliability engineering.
The system-state trajectory depends on how long the system remains in each
state before transiting to the next one, and which component(s) changes state at
the transition time. The component state transition is a deterministic process as
shown in Figure 5. If any of the components in the system changes its state, the
system transits to the next state subsequently. According to this principle, random
numbers are generated by Monte Carlo sampling from the current state sojourn time
distribution of each component; and in each simulation run, the minimum value of
those random numbers decides the point of time when system transits to next state.
Algorithm for the system-state trajectory is designed as the following(Algorithm
1). The total number of components in a system under review is N . The total number
of transition steps is J . If total number of K simulations will be performed for the
system-state trajectory prediction, the following items are dened for the algorithm:
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1. A 3-D array S(I;N;K) to record the system-state trajectory.
2. A matrix time(I   1; K) to record the transition time.
3. A vector container(1; N) to temporarily hold the random numbers generated
at each step.
4. State1 == 0, State2 == 1, State3 == 2.
5. S(1; :; k) = zeros(1; N).
6. time(0; k) = 0.
7. Random Generator 1 - random generate a number from exponential distribution
equation 2.10 with the component specic failure rate.
8. Random Generator 2 - random generate a number from probability distribution
function equation 2.15 with the component specic failure rate and inspection
interval.
9. Random Generator 3 - random generate a number from probability distribution
function equation tted using industrial repair time data.
There are two options to call i to stop the kth discrete event simulation. The
rst one is when:
time(i  1; k)   
time(i; k)   (2.16)
where  is a predetermined number in the unit of time. For example, it could be a
plant lifetime, or it could be a number of years the analyst decides will be considered
for the risk assessment.
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Algorithm 1: The pseudocode of system-state trajectory.
for each simulation run k do1
for each transition run i do2
for each component n do3
if S(i; n; k) = 0 then4
call Random Generator 1 to get ti;5
end6
else if S(i; n; k) = 1 then7
call Random Generator 2 to get ti;8
end9
else if S(i; n; k) = 2 then10
call Random Generator 3 to get ti;11
end12
container(1; n) = ti;13
end14
min(container(1; :)); q = component index of min(container(1; :));15
time(i; k) = time(i  1; k) +min(container(1; :));
if S(i; q; k) = 0 then16
S(i+ 1; q; k) = 1, and the rest of the q   1 component remain at the17
same state as at i
end18
else if S(i; q; k) = 1 then19
S(i+ 1; q; k) = 2, and the rest of the q   1 component remain at the20
same state as at i
end21
else if S(i; q; k) = 2 then22
S(i+ 1; q; k) = 0, and the rest of the q   1 component remain at the23
same state as at i
end24
end25
call Eliminator 1 equation2:16 or Eliminator 2 equation2:1726
end27
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The other way to eliminate the kth simulation is when:
i = ! (2.17)
where ! is an integer that represents the number of discrete transition steps. In this
case, analyst decides the number of transition steps prior to the modeling.
b. Process Dynamics Modeling
The subject of oil/gas and chemical process dynamics is the evolution over time of
physics and engineering variables such as temperature, pressure, liquid level, reactiv-
ity, ow rate, heat transfer, mass transfer, energy transfer, etc. The process dynamics
is essentially governed by the laws of physics and engineering, such as kinetic theory,
chemical reaction, statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and transportation theory,
etc. The process units either must be maintained closed to their steady states for
continuous operation or follow optimal trajectories for batch operation. Once the
study scope is dened, interests of process variables are determined. Mathematical
equations will be developed to characterize the process dynamics. We dene the pro-
cess vector x whose elements include all process variables of interest under the DORA
study. Ordinary dierential or partial dierential equations are used in this section
to illustrate process description:
dmx
dt
= fi(x)
or
@mx
@t
= fi(x) (2.18)
with initial condition x(0) = x0 and where i is the index of system-state.
Safety criteria are needed for any risk assessment. From a safety point of
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view, the criteria in DORA are dened as upper/lower boundary conditions xu =
(xu1; xu2; xu3; : : : ; xun) and xl = (xl1; xl2; xl3; : : : ; xln). Those values generate a sur-
face or sphere to dene the safe domain of the system. These boundary conditions
will be used as cuto values for the probabilistic simulation.
In Markovian method for dynamic risk assessment, a Markovian state in a system
is described by three elements: process variable, system-state, and time. The history
of state transition in a system is a succession of states (x1; i1; t1), (x2; i2; t2), : : :,
(xn; in; tn). A transition at time tn is in process variable state xn and has just entered
discrete system-state in. Discretization is not merely needed for system-state trajec-
tory. The evolution of process variables are also needed to be discretized to charac-
terize the state of a system. The characterization of process variables in a Markovian
approach requires explicit discretization to model the real process variable trajectory.
On the other hand, a denitive discretization required in both system-state trajectory
and process variable evolution will increase the numerical computation diculties.
In this DORA study, discretization of process variables is not necessarily driven
by Markovian properties. Process variable is not integrated into the state characteri-
zation in the discrete system-state trajectory simulation. In fact, the system-state tra-
jectory determines where and when to discretize the process variable evolution(Figure
7). The system state conguration decides the parameters in function fi for system-
state i in equation 2.18; whereas the sojourn time of the system on certain state
quantied how long the process variable evolution will follow the rule determined by
function fi(Algorithm 2).
In an overview, the structure of discrete event simulation could be broken down
at system-state transition level and component state transition level. The discrete
event simulation simulator is connected to process dynamics simulator at system-state
transition level. Discrete event simulation starts from component state transition,
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Fig. 7. The relationship between system-state trajectory and process variable evolu-
tion.
Algorithm 2: The pseudocode of DORA probabilistic computation.
countu = 0;1
countl = 0;2
for each discrete event simulation run k do3
the process variable initial conditions are x04
for each transition run i do5
connect to algorithm1 to get the system-state identity;6
fi is determined immediately according to this identity;7
solve fi with initial condition of xtime(i 1;k), and the integration upper8
limit of time(i; k);
end9
u = find(x > xu);10
l = find(x < xl);11
if length(u) > 0 then12
countu = countu + 1;13
end14
and;15
if length(l) > 0 then16
countl = countl + 1;17
end18
end19
the probability of process variable exceeding upper safety boundary = countu=K;20
the probability of process variable exceeding lower safety boundary = countl=K;21
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and transfers the data to process dynamics simulator after nishing a system-state
trajectory simulation. Reliability information, inspection interval, and repair rate
are the information needed to initiate the discrete event simulation according to
Algorithm 1. Information exchange occurs between the two simulators once a full
system-state trajectory is determined in each loop.
c. Computation Reduction
In dierent system states, the parameters in equation 2.18 are dierent to char-
acterize the evolution of process variables in phases. The system-state trajectory
needs to be determined to specify those parameters in each state. The discrete event
simulation on system-state trajectory demonstrates when and what component be-
comes abnormal, how long the state sojourn time is, and how long it will take to
restore the system to normal operating conditions. However, it is not true that the
process variable would go beyond the desirable region whenever an abnormal event
occurs. To study operational risk, the Monte Carlo simulation needs to be performed
on the process variable evolution upon every single system-state trajectory. There-
fore, it ends up with the total number of continuous simulations on the entire process
variable evolution needed as:
n = nk (2.19)
where:
n - total number of simulations on the whole process variable evolution needed
nk - number of simulations needed on system-state trajectory
Even though the number of simulation runs is equal to the system-state tra-
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jectory simulation number, the numerical simulation on the whole evolution of pro-
cess variable is still a great deal of work. Therefore, problem decomposition should
be considered to save computational storage space. A reasonable argument is that
the process variable evolution at steady state does not necessarily need to be simu-
lated. The process variable should remain in the steady state region as long as all
the components are under normal operation no matter in which system-state trajec-
tory conguration. It saves computational storage space to have a pre-Monte Carlo
simulation on the probability of process variables exceeding safety boundaries given
that each individual component becomes into an abnormal state(Algorithm 3). The
pre-Monte Carlo simulation calculates the probability of process variables exceeding
safety boundary only when the components become abnormal. The probability of
the system process variable exceeding the desirable operating region is determined
using the probability of component abnormal event and the probability of the process
variable exceeding the desirable operating region when the individual component goes
into abnormal state:
P = Nn=1qnpn (2.20)
where:
P - probability of a process variable exceeding safety boundary in the system
n - index of the component in the system
N - total number of the components in the system
qn - probability of process variable exceeding the safety boundary when the compo-
nent n goes into abnormal state
pn - probability of component n goes into abnormal state
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Algorithm 3: The pseudocode of pre-Monte Carlo simulation in DORA.
for each simulation run k do1
the process variable initial conditions are x0;2
for each component n do3
parameters for fi is determined immediately according to component4
abnormal status;
solve fi with initial condition of x0, and eliminate the integration until the5
integration time is long enough for any test/inspection interval to be
applied.
end6
Random generate a number r from an uniform distribution between [0; 1];7
cuttime = f 1 of equation 2.15 with r and an inspection interval T ;8
cuttime = ceil(cuttime); and var = x(1 : cuttime);9
above = find( var > xu); and below = find( var < xl);10
if length(above) == 0 (length(below) == 0) then11
countabove(k; 1) = 0 (countbelow(k; 1) = 0)12
end13
else14
countabove(k; 1) = 1 (countbelow(k; 1) = 1)15
end16
end17
the probability of process variable exceeding upper safety boundary18
= length(find(countabove == 1))=K;
the probability of process variable exceeding lower safety boundary19
= length(find(countbelow == 1))=K;
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qn can be gained by pre-Monte Carlo simulations(Algorithm 3), whereas pns can
be obtained by the Monte Carlo simulation on system-state trajectory(Algorithm 1).
The total number of simulations needed in this decomposed strategy is n
0
:
n
0
= N  nd + nk (2.21)
where
n
0
- total number of simulations needed
N - total number of the components in the system
nd - number of simulations needed on process dynamics upon each component ab-
normal event
nk - number of simulations needed on system-state trajectory
n
0
is a larger number than n, however, in the decomposed strategy, simulation
on the process variable evolution given all the components operate in normal state is
omitted. The process dynamics dierential equations are not required to be solved
at the whole time span but only when component goes into abnormal state.
6. Incident Consequence Modeling
The consequence analysis in DORA is nothing dierent from general consequence
modeling except the uncertainty characterization. DORA incident consequence mod-
eling includes toxic release models, source models, dispersion models, res and explo-
sions, etc. In many cases, parameters in those models are uncertain and usually need
to be determined by expert judgment. In DORA, a probabilistic approach is proposed
to characterize this epistemic uncertainty in the consequence modeling. Assuming Z
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in consequence modeling O is a vector of uncertain variables, algorithm 4 is designed
for the uncertainty characterization in DORA consequence modeling.
7. Risk Determination
Risk is dened as:
risk = probability  consequence (2.22)
After DORA probabilistic analysis and incident consequence analysis, risk pro-
les should be generated considering both the aspects of probability and consequence
of potential incidents in the system.
8. Is the Risk Acceptable?
A zero risk level is not attainable. After risk proles are generated in DORA,
an argument should be made not merely whether the risks are acceptable or not, but
also how low a risk level can be achieved by feasible risk reduction if it is already
in a tolerable region. These two questions need to be addressed in sequence. In
this step, the question of "whether a risk is in totally unacceptable region or not"
will be addressed. The decision is made according to health and safety guidelines,
international standards and laws, and suggestion from advisory bodies, etc. If the
risk level is higher than the minimum acceptance criteria, the assessed risk is in
the totally unacceptable region. In this case, modications on the process design,
operation procedure or emergency strategy have to be made and the risk assessment
will start over again from the very beginning at Step 1 through Step 7. This process
will be eliminated until the risk level is below the totally unacceptable criteria.
40
Algorithm 4: The pseudocode of uncertainty characterization for conse-
quence modeling in DORA.
Dene Zmin and Zmax;1
for each Monte Carlo simulation run i do2
Random generate a number  from uniform distribution between (0; 1);3
Z
0
=   ( Zmax   Zmin) + Zmin;4
solve modeling U using Z
0
and results are saved in re(1; i);5
end6
u1 = min( re);7
u2 = max( re);8
Dene a bin number nbin to calculate u-population;9
% width of bins10
du = ( u2  u1)=nbin;11
% values at center of bins12
uc = u1 + du=2 : du : u2  du=2;13
% calculates populations in bins14
upop = zeros(1; nbin);15
for i = 1 : length(re) do16
% falls in to the idx'th bin17
idx = ceil(( re(i)  u1)= du);18
if idx == 0 then19
idx = 1;20
end21
upop(idx) = upop(idx) + 1;22
end23
% renormalizes so that sum(upop) = 124
upop = upop100totalnumberofsimulationrun ;25
plot upop vs. re.26
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Fig. 8. ALARP(As Low As Reasonably Practicable).
9. Cost-Benet Analysis
Determining that a risk has been reduced to ALARP (As Low As Reasonably
Practicable)(Figure 8)(HSE) involves a cost-benet analysis. When the risk remains
in the tolerable region, the question of "how low a risk level can be achieved by feasible
risk reduction eorts" needs to be addressed. Usually, the region of 'risk is totally
unacceptable' is much smaller than 'risk is tolerable' region. In most cases, risk is not
only expected to be in the tolerable region but expected to be reduced to ALARP.
This practice must work within the real world constraints of feasibility, practicality
and cost. DORA will provide ecient cost-benet analysis to decision makers. An
optimization on component inspection interval in an oil/gas separation system will
be illustrated in Chapter VI.
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Fig. 9. A simplied PFD of an oil/gas and water separator.
10. Build and/or Operate the System
With the completion of the previous steps, the system is ready to be built or
operated.
D. Case Study I - Level Control in an Oil/Gas Separator
1. Process Description
In oshore plants, gravity separators are used to separate oil, gas and water for
exportation. A simplied PFD of this separation is shown in Figure 9.
Consider the material balance of liquids in separators, and assume a linear rela-
tionship between the height H and the volume, then:
dH(t)
dt
=
Qin(t) Qout(t)
A
(2.23)
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where Qin(t) is the inlet volumetric ow rate, and Qout(t) is the outlet volumetric
ow rate. For simplicity, the outlet water ow and the outlet oil ow are assumed to
be equal. The openness dynamic of the control valve is considered fast. A factor  is
related to the valve openness. Then, the outlet ow rate is given by:
Qout = 2
p
H (2.24)
PI controller is one of the most used controllers for level and ow control in
industry. Given that PI controller is applied in this case study,  is governed by:
 = 0 +Kc[e(t) +
1
l
R t
0
e(t)dt
] (2.25)
where e(t) = Hset  H(t). The inlet ow rate is given by:
Qin = "Qin nor (2.26)
where Qin nor is the inlet ow rate in normal operation state. " is a factor between
(0; 1) to quantify the inlet ow abnormal situation. When the pump normally op-
erates, " = 1. Substituting equation 2.24, equation 2.25, and equation 2.26 into
equation 2.23, we can obtain the following equation after linearization:
A
dH
dt
= "Qinnor +
0
p
H0
2
  0
2
p
H0
H  
p
H0 (2.27)
with initial values (0) = 0 and H(0) = H0. Therefore, the process transfer function
is given by:
G(s) =
H(s)
(s)
=
 pH0
As+ 0
2
p
H0
(2.28)
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Table I. Process parameters of the separator system.
Process parameters
Qinnor 310m
3=h
H 1:5m
A 1:766m2
Hset 0:7m
Qoutnor 155m
3=h
PI controller model A is selected according to IMC method[58], which is:
G(s) =
K
s+ 1
(2.29)
KcK =

c
(2.30)
I =  (2.31)
In our case:
c = 1 (2.32)
K =  2H0
0
(2.33)
 =
2A
p
H0
0
(2.34)
All the process parameters and control parameters are summarized in Table I.
The following DORA probabilistic modeling is specic for the hazard, scenario and
failure mode of fire hazard ! overow/dryout scenario ! failure mode combination:
pump - low output; CV - random valve opening; LT - random level reading error.
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2. Component Sojourn Time Distribution Characterization
The system-state trajectory simulation inputs are the component state sojourn
time distribution parameters. To formulate the sojourn time distribution of compo-
nent State 1, the failure rates for the components in this study are collected from the
OREDA database[59]. Low output is selected as the failure mode for the pump; spuri-
ous operation is selected as the failure mode for the CV; abnormal instrument reading
is selected as the failure mode for the LT. The reliability data are specic to those
failure modes respectively. All of the three failure modes are not necessarily leading
to a system shutdown, but may cause an operational failure. The parameters in the
process equations and control equations vary as the component state transits(Table
II).
With exponential distribution assumption discussed before, the probability den-
sity functions of the sojourn time of component State 1 are summarized as the fol-
lowing equations:
for pump:
fA(x;A) = 2:5 10 6e 2:510 6x (2.35)
for CV:
fB(x;B) = 6:1 10 7e 6:110 7x (2.36)
for LT:
fC(x;C) = 2:4 10 7e 2:410 7x (2.37)
where A, B, and C are the failure rates of pump, CV and LT in the failure mode of
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abnormal as low output, abnormal as random valve opening, and abnormal as random
level reading error respectively.
The sojourn time distribution functions of component State 2 are summarized
as follows according to equation 2.15, with the assumption of constant inspection
interval TA, TB, and TC for pump, CV and LT respectively:
PA(y;A) =
e 2:510
 6(TA y)   e 2:510 6TA
1  e 2:510 6TA (2.38)
PB(y;B) =
e 6:110
 7(TB y)   e 6:110 7TB
1  e 6:110 7TB (2.39)
PC(y;C) =
e 2:410
 7(TC y)   e 2:410 7TC
1  e 2:410 7TC (2.40)
The sojourn time distributions of component State 3 are obtained by distribution
tting. The repair labor hour data of each component is collected from industry. The
repair time for the pump and CV ts to Weibull distribution, and the repair time for
LT ts to exponential distribution:
fA(z;
0
A; kA) =
0:73
8:13
(
z
8:13
) 0:27e (
z
8:13
)0:73 (2.41)
fB(z;
0
B; kB) =
1:25
5:83
(
z
5:83
)0:25e (
z
5:83
)1:25 (2.42)
fC(z;
0
C) =
1
2:92
e 
1
2:92
z (2.43)
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Fig. 10. Pump, CV, and LT abnormal event probabilities using dierent inspection
intervals: half daily, daily, weekly, monthly, semi-annually, annually, every
two years, and every three years.
3. System-state Trajectory Simulation
Given the assumption that the plant has a 30-year lifetime, Monte Carlo sim-
ulations on the system-trajectory are performed to study the probabilities of pump
abnormal event, CV abnormal event and LT abnormal event. Since the inspection
interval is considered as an important parameter in this study, dierent inspection
intervals for pump, CV and LT are tested to research their impact on component ab-
normal event probability. Half day, daily, weekly, monthly, semi-annually, annually,
two years, and three years are tested in the simulations. When the inspection interval
of one component is varied, the inspection intervals for all other components are xed
at 12h. The abnormal event probabilities of each component given eight dierent in-
spection intervals are shown in Figure 10. It is found that the inspection interval has
no impact on component abnormal event probability. This is because the sequence
of component behavior is dened as: normal operation ! failure or abnormal event
occurs without being detected ! failure or abnormal event is detected ! repair and
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restore the component to normal operation. Abnormal event always occurs before
being detected through inspection. However, the inspection interval has impact on
overow/dryout probability as it determines how fast the system can be restored to
normal operating conditions. An optimal inspection interval will nd the component
abnormal situation and corrective action will always be taken to restore the system
before the process parameters exceed the desirable regions. In this study, mean value
of component abnormal event probabilities with eight dierent inspection intervals
will be used in the future calculation:
ppump = 0:93
pCV = 0:33
pLT = 0:14 (2.44)
The frequencies of pump abnormal event, CV abnormal event and LT abnormal
event are also simulated in a prolonged time period and the results are summarized
in Figure 11. The mean values of component abnormal event frequencies turn out to
be the same as the frequency data we collected in the OREDA database and used as
input. The results of the frequencies simulation conrm the conclusion that the in-
spection interval in this study has no impact on the frequency of component abnormal
event. In addition, it validates the algorithm for system-state trajectory. It cannot
be emphasized more that inspection interval does aect the frequency of component
fatal failure, but not abnormal event as inspection detects abnormal situation and
corrective action must be taken before the fatal failure actually occurs.
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Fig. 11. Mean values and standard deviations of Pump, CV, and LT abnormal event
frequencies using dierent inspection intervals: half daily, daily, weekly,
monthly, semi-annually, annually, every two years, and every three years.
4. Probability of Incident Due to Individual Component Precursor
In this case study, the safe boundaries are dened as:
Hu = 1:5m
Hl = 0:1m (2.45)
Therefore, Monte Carlo simulation based on Algorithm 3 is performed to study
the probability of separator overow (H > 1:5m) and dryout (H < 0:1m) when each
of the components, pump, CV, and LT, individually goes from normal operation to
abnormal situation until the abnormal situation is detected. The simulation time
span is suciently long to study the impact of testing/inspection interval on the
probabilistic simulation results. Dierent inspection intervals, 12 hours, one day, one
week, one month, semi-annual, annual, two years, and three years, are tested in the
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Fig. 12. Overow probability due to individual pump abnormal event, CV abnormal
event and LT abnormal event respectively using dierent inspection intervals:
half daily, daily, weekly, monthly, semi-annually, annually every two years and
every three years.
study. As the inspection interval increases, the probability of overow and dryout
due to pump abnormal event, CV abnormal event, and LT abnormal event increases
except probability of dryout due to CV abnormal event(Figures 12 and 13).
The probability of separator dryout due to CV abnormal event is zero no matter
what inspection interval among the tested eight applies. The overow probability due
to CV abnormal is 17:4  359 times greater than that due to pump abnormal event;
the overow probability due to LT abnormal event is 14:6  244:5 times greater than
that due to pump abnormal event; and the dryout probability due to LT abnormal
event is 5:1  29:7 times greater than that due to pump abnormal event. Therefore,
the CV abnormal event is the most critical reason for overow scenario, whereas the
LT abnormal event is the most critical reason for dryout scenario.
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Fig. 13. Dryout probability due to individual pump abnormal event, CV abnormal
event and LT abnormal event respectively using dierent inspection intervals:
half daily, daily, weekly, monthly, semi-annually, annually every two years and
every three years.
5. Separator Overow/Dryout Probability
The probability data of separator overow and dryout upon pump, CV, and
LT abnormal event individually by the pre-Monte Carlo simulation are summarized
in Table III and Table IV. They will be used to calculate probability of separator
overow/dryout in the plant lifetime and frequency of separator overow/dryout.
Results are plotted in Figures 14, 15, 16, and 17. Each point in the gures carries the
information on annual total inspection cost, separator overow/dryout probability or
frequency, and the corresponding component inspection intervals. Inspection interval
less than one day for LT keeps the dryout frequency at least around 10 times lower
than that when the interval is more than one day. The probability of dryout will
be kept less than 0:1 if LT inspection interval is less than one month. However,
the objective of this step in DORA is to provide industry a tool to assess dynamic
operational risk. Further inspection interval optimization study is needed and will
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Fig. 14. Separator overow probability vs. annual total component inspection cost.
be demonstrated in Chapter V in this dissertation. The decision on the component
testing/inspection interval is left to decision makers according to the cost-benet
analysis.
6. Sensitivity Analysis on Model Inputs
For DORA probabilistic modeling, component state sojourn time distributions
are the inputs for system-state trajectory simulation. Among the three component
states, normal operating, abnormal event undetected, and abnormal event detected
and under repair, the third state sojourn time distribution is obtained by tting
distribution to industry component repair time data. In the case that the collected
data is sucient enough, distribution tting is statistically satised with accepted
uncertainty. However, it is not always possible to nd enough data. In a highly
reliable system, a single failure may occur at a frequency in order of 10 6 and repair
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Fig. 15. Separator dryout probability vs. annual total component inspection cost.
Fig. 16. Separator overow frequency vs. annual total component inspection cost.
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Fig. 17. Separator dryout frequency vs. annual total component inspection cost.
happens at a corresponding low frequency so that the repair data is usually not enough
for a good distribution tting. Given the limited repair time data points, the major
concern on this probabilistic modeling uncertainty includes:
 what distribution type should be selected for component repair time distribution
tting;
 whether the distribution type is a sensitive factor for DORA probabilistic mod-
eling results.
When a failure occurs to a component, the component must be repaired and it
is then unavailable for processing during a certain amount of time called the repair
time[60]. In reliability engineering, random variables from exponential distribution,
gamma distribution, log-normal distribution or Weibull distribution are usually as-
sumed to characterize the time-to-repair distribution in most of the models. By se-
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lecting candidates from those distribution families, epistemic uncertainty is reduced
by engineering expert judgment. The uncertainty is further reduced by selecting the
distribution model according to the rank of goodness-of-t. The objective of this sub-
section is to propose and apply statistical techniques to characterize the uncertainty
and sensitivity on the distribution model selection and the associated parameters de-
termination, in order to study how the DORA probabilistic modeling output can be
apportioned by the distribution model selection.
There are several techniques to examine how well a sample of data agrees with a
given distribution as its population. In those goodness-of-t techniques, hypothesis
test is based on measuring the discrepancy or consistency of the sample data to the
hypothesized distribution. Chi-square test is used to measure how well the t matches
the data if the data are represented by discrete points with Gaussian uncertainties[61].
However, the value of the chi-square test statistic depends on how the data is binned.
Another disadvantage of chi-square is that it requires an adequate sample size for the
approximations to be valid. Pearson's chi-square test is distinguished from the case
with Gaussian errors, and is applied if the data are represented by integer numbers of
events in discrete bins, following Poisson statistics rule[62]. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-
S) test is a goodness-of-t measurement technique for one-dimensional data samples.
It is used to test whether the data sample comes from a population with a specic
distribution[63]. Anderson-Darling test[64] is a modication of K-S test and gives
more weight to the tails than does the K-S test. There are several others, such as the
Shapiro-Wilk test[65] and the probability plot[66] for goodness-of-t measurement.
Chi-square test, Kolmogorove-Smirnov test, and Anderson- Darling test are proposed
in this subsection to measure the goodness-of-t to rank the distribution models for
characterizing the component repair time distribution.
59
a. The Chi-square Test
The null hypothesis in a chi-square test is:
H0: The data follow a specied distribution.
Ha: The data do not follow the specied distribution.
The data are divided into k bins and the test statistic is dened as:
2 =
kX
i=1
(Oi   Ei)2
Ei
(2.46)
where Oi is the observed frequency for bin i and Ei is the expected frequency for bin
i, which is given by:
Ei = F (Yu)  F (Yl) (2.47)
where F is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the distribution being
tested, Yu is the upper limit for class i, and Yl is the lower limit for class i. The test
statistic approximately follows a chi-square distribution with (k   c   1) degrees of
freedom where k is the number of non-empty cells and c is the number of estimated
parameters for the distribution. Therefore, the hypothesis that the data are from a
population with the specied distribution is rejected if
2 > 2(1 ;k 1) (2.48)
where 2(1 ;k 1) is the chi-square inverse CDF with (k  1) degrees of freedom and a
signicance level of . Though the number of degrees of freedom is (k   c  1), it is
calculated as (k   1) since this kind of test is least likely to reject the t in error.
b. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
The null hypothesis in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is:
H0: The data follow a specied distribution.
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Ha: The data do not follow the specied distribution.
The K-S test statistic is dened as:
D = max1iN(F (Yi)  (i  1)
N
;
i
N
  F (Yi)) (2.49)
where i is the index of the total N ordered data points Y1,Y2,. . . ,YN . F is the cumula-
tive distribution function of the distribution being tested which must be a continuous
distribution. The hypothesis is rejected at signicance level  if the test statistic, D,
is greater than the critical value obtained from a table. There are variations of these
tables in dierent literatures that use dierent scaling for the K-S test statistic and
critical regions. The software programs that perform a K-S test provide the relevant
critical values.
c. The Anderson-Darling Test
The null hypothesis in an Anderson-Darling test is:
H0: The data follow a specied distribution.
Ha: The data do not follow the specied distribution.
The Anderson-Darling test statistic is dened as:
A2 =  N   S (2.50)
where
S =
NX
i=1
(2i  1)
N
[lnF (Yi) + ln (1  F (YN+1 i))] (2.51)
F is the cumulative distribution function of the specied distribution and Yi are the
ordered data points. The critical values for the Anderson-Darling test depend on
the specic distribution that is being tested. The hypothesis that the data follow a
specied distribution is rejected if the test statistic, A, is greater than the critical
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value. The software programs that were used to perform an Anderson-Darling test
provide the relevant critical values.
d. Graphical Goodness-of-t Measurement
To illustrate the goodness-of-t measurement graphically, probability-probability
(P-P) plot, quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot and probability dierence graph are created.
The P-P plot is a graph of the empirical CDF values plotted against the theoretical
CDF values. The Q-Q plot is a graph of the input data points plotted against the
theoretical distribution quantiles. The reference diagonal line in the Q-Q plot is the
line along which the graph points should fall. Both P-P plot and Q-Q plot will be
approximately linear if the specied theoretical distribution is the correct model to
represent the input data. The probability dierence graph is a plot of the dierence
between the empirical CDF and the theoretical CDF.
Four widely used distribution types in reliability engineering modeling: expo-
nential, gamma, lognormal, and Weibull are used to t the collected repair time
data. Each type has two distributions with dierent number of parameters. They
are exponential with single parameter (exponential), exponential with two parame-
ters (exponential (2P)), gamma with two parameters (gamma), gamma with three
parameters (gamma (3P)), lognormal with two parameters (lognormal), lognormal
with three parameters (lognormal (3P), Weibull with two parameters (Weibull), and
Weibull with three parameters (Weibull (3P)). The tting distribution parameters
are summarized in Table V.
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The goodness-of-t measurement results in chi-square test are summarized in
Table VI. K-S test results are shown in Tables VII, VIII, and IX. A-D test results
can be found in Table X, XI, and XII. P-P plots of pump, CV, and LT repair time
tting to lognormal distribution are shown in Figures 18, 19, and 20 respectively. Q-
Q plots of pump, CV, and LT repair time tting to lognormal distribution are shown
in Figures 21, 22, and 23 respectively. Probability dierent graphs of pump, CV, and
LT repair time tting to lognormal distribution are shown in Figures 24, 25, and 26
respectively.
The Chi-square test and K-S test results for pump repair time tting show that
all the distribution tting hypotheses are rejected. In A-D test, lognormal and log-
normal (3P) tting for pump repair time are not rejected at low  values. In K-S
test, result for CV repair time tting shows that all the distribution tting hypothe-
ses are accepted but the ttings in A-D test reject the hypotheses on exponential
(2P), gamma (3P), lognormal (3P), and Weibull (3P). All the LT repair time dis-
tribution tting hypotheses are accepted in K-S test, but the ttings to exponential
(2P), gamma (3P), and Weibull (3P) are rejected. Therefore, the distribution tting
selection and ranking results are: "lognormal (3P), lognormal" for pump repair time
distribution tting, "lognormal, exponential, gamma, Weibull" for CV repair time
distribution tting and "lognormal (3P), lognormal, gamma, exponential, Weibull"
for LT repair time distribution tting. Those selected distributions with associated
parameters will be used in the following sensitivity analysis.
The sensitivity of the component repair time distribution type is measured in this
case study on the level control system of an oil/gas separator. Overow is dened as
the scenario when the level in the separator is greater than 1:5m. Dryout is dened
as the scenario when the level in the separator is less than 0:1m. The probability of
overow and dryout will be the output of the DORA probabilistic modeling(Figure27).
64
T
ab
le
V
I.
T
h
e
C
h
i-
sq
u
ar
e
te
st
re
su
lt
s
of
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
go
o
d
n
es
s
of
p
u
m
p
re
p
ai
r
ti
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on

tt
in
g.
P
u
m
p
C
h
i-
S
q
u
ar
e
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
G
am
m
a
L
og
n
or
m
al
W
ei
b
u
ll
D
eg
.
of
fr
ee
d
om
7
7
7
7
S
ta
ti
st
ic
22
.4
9
24
4.
66
34
.6
9
31
.2
7
P
-V
al
u
e
2.
09
E
-0
3
0.
00
E
+
00
1.
28
E
-0
5
5.
56
E
-0
5
R
an
k
1
6
4
3

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
9:
80
j12
:0
2j1
4:
07
j16
:6
2j
18
:4
8
9:
80
j12
:0
2j1
4:
07
j16
:6
2j
18
:4
8
9:
80
j12
:0
2j1
4:
07
j16
:6
2j
18
:4
8
9:
80
j12
:0
2j1
4:
07
j16
:6
2j
18
:4
8
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
P
u
m
p
C
h
i-
S
q
u
ar
e
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
(2
P
)
G
am
m
a(
3P
)
L
og
n
or
m
al
(3
P
)
W
ei
b
u
ll
(3
P
)
D
eg
.
of
fr
ee
d
om
7
 
6
 
S
ta
ti
st
ic
76
.4
44
 
30
.4
9
 
P
-V
al
u
e
7.
29
E
-1
4
 
3.
17
E
-0
5
 
R
an
k
5
 
2
 

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
 
 
 
 
 
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
 
 
 
 
 
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
9:
80
j12
:0
2j1
4:
07
j16
:6
2j
18
:4
8
 
 
 
 
 
8:
56
j10
:6
5j1
2:
59
j15
:0
3j
16
:8
1
 
 
 
 
 
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
 
 
 
 
 
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
 
 
 
 
 
65
T
ab
le
V
II
.
T
h
e
K
ol
m
og
or
ov
-S
m
ir
n
ov
te
st
re
su
lt
s
of
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
go
o
d
n
es
s
of
p
u
m
p
re
p
ai
r
ti
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on

tt
in
g.
P
u
m
p
K
-S
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
G
am
m
a
L
og
n
or
m
al
W
ei
b
u
ll
S
am
p
le
si
ze
16
9
16
9
16
9
16
9
S
ta
ti
st
ic
0:
19
32
0:
47
30
0:
13
39
0:
17
24
P
-V
al
u
e
5:
36
E
 
06
0:
00
E
+
00
4:
21
E
 
03
7:
33
E
 
05
R
an
k
4
8
1
3

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
P
u
m
p
K
-S
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
(2
P
)
G
am
m
a(
3P
)
L
og
n
or
m
al
(3
P
)
W
ei
b
u
ll
(3
P
)
S
am
p
le
si
ze
16
9
16
9
16
9
16
9
S
ta
ti
st
ic
0:
24
56
0:
28
22
0:
15
5
0:
22
65
P
-V
al
u
e
1:
97
E
 
9
2:
58
E
 
12
5:
18
E
 
4
4:
39
E
 
8
R
an
k
6
7
2
5

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
0:
08
j0:
09
j0:
10
j0:
12
j0:
13
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
66
T
ab
le
V
II
I.
T
h
e
K
ol
m
og
or
ov
-S
m
ir
n
ov
te
st
re
su
lt
s
of
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
go
o
d
n
es
s
of
C
V
re
p
ai
r
ti
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on

tt
in
g.
C
V
K
-S
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
G
am
m
a
L
og
n
or
m
al
W
ei
b
u
ll
S
am
p
le
si
ze
6
6
6
6
S
ta
ti
st
ic
0.
34
46
0.
34
71
0.
41
02
0.
34
01
P
-V
al
u
e
3.
85
E
-0
1
3.
76
E
-0
1
2.
00
E
-0
1
4.
00
E
-0
1
R
an
k
4
5
7
3

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
R
ej
ec
t?
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
C
V
K
-S
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
(2
P
)
G
am
m
a(
3P
)
L
og
n
or
m
al
(3
P
)
W
ei
b
u
ll
(3
P
)
S
am
p
le
si
ze
6
6
6
6
S
ta
ti
st
ic
0.
47
8
0.
34
82
0.
31
97
0.
32
02
P
-V
al
u
e
8.
79
E
-0
2
3.
73
E
-0
1
4.
74
E
-0
1
4.
72
E
-0
1
R
an
k
8
6
1
2

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
0:
41
j0:
47
j0:
52
j0:
58
j0:
62
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
67
T
ab
le
IX
.
T
h
e
K
ol
m
og
or
ov
-S
m
ir
n
ov
te
st
re
su
lt
s
of
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
go
o
d
n
es
s
of
L
T
re
p
ai
r
ti
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on

tt
in
g.
L
T
K
-S
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
G
am
m
a
L
og
n
or
m
al
W
ei
b
u
ll
S
am
p
le
si
ze
5
5
5
5
S
ta
ti
st
ic
0.
47
54
0.
28
62
0.
27
97
0.
29
55
P
-V
al
u
e
1.
48
E
-0
1
7.
18
E
-0
1
7.
42
E
-0
1
6.
82
E
-0
1
R
an
k
8
5
4
6

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
L
T
K
-S
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
(2
P
)
G
am
m
a(
3P
)
L
og
n
or
m
al
(3
P
)
W
ei
b
u
ll
(3
P
)
S
am
p
le
si
ze
5
5
5
5
S
ta
ti
st
ic
0.
20
29
0.
37
69
0.
20
42
0.
20
93
P
-V
al
u
e
9.
57
E
-0
1
3.
76
E
-0
1
9.
55
E
-0
1
9.
46
E
-0
1
R
an
k
1
7
2
3

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
0:
45
j0:
51
j0:
56
j0:
63
j0:
67
R
ej
ec
t?
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
68
T
ab
le
X
.
T
h
e
A
n
d
er
so
n
-D
ar
li
n
g
te
st
re
su
lt
s
of
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
go
o
d
n
es
s
of
p
u
m
p
re
p
ai
r
ti
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on

tt
in
g.
P
u
m
p
A
-D
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
G
am
m
a
L
og
n
or
m
al
W
ei
b
u
ll
S
am
p
le
si
ze
16
9
16
9
16
9
16
9
S
ta
ti
st
ic
9.
20
76
41
.4
87
2.
85
31
9.
01
28
R
an
k
4
5
2
3

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jN
ojN
o
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
P
u
m
p
A
-D
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
(2
P
)
G
am
m
a(
3P
)
L
og
n
or
m
al
(3
P
)
W
ei
b
u
ll
(3
P
)
S
am
p
le
si
ze
16
9
16
9
16
9
16
9
S
ta
ti
st
ic
60
.7
19
66
.4
23
2.
54
38
63
.2
6
R
an
k
6
8
1
7

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jN
ojN
o
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
69
T
ab
le
X
I.
T
h
e
A
n
d
er
so
n
-D
ar
li
n
g
te
st
re
su
lt
s
of
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
go
o
d
n
es
s
of
C
V
re
p
ai
r
ti
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on

tt
in
g.
C
V
A
-D
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
G
am
m
a
L
og
n
or
m
al
W
ei
b
u
ll
S
am
p
le
si
ze
6
6
6
6
S
ta
ti
st
ic
0.
94
75
0.
95
13
0.
87
71
1.
81
05
R
an
k
2
3
1
4

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
R
ej
ec
t?
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
Y
es
jN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
C
V
A
-D
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
(2
P
)
G
am
m
a(
3P
)
L
og
n
or
m
al
(3
P
)
W
ei
b
u
ll
(3
P
)
S
am
p
le
si
ze
6
6
6
6
S
ta
ti
st
ic
6.
28
49
3.
98
57
4.
17
15
3.
91
29
R
an
k
8
6
7
5

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
70
T
ab
le
X
II
.
T
h
e
A
n
d
er
so
n
-D
ar
li
n
g
te
st
re
su
lt
s
of
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
go
o
d
n
es
s
of
L
T
re
p
ai
r
ti
m
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on

tt
in
g.
L
T
A
-D
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
G
am
m
a
L
og
n
or
m
al
W
ei
b
u
ll
S
am
p
le
si
ze
5
5
5
5
S
ta
ti
st
ic
1.
21
2
0.
33
07
0.
33
01
1.
82
13
R
an
k
4
3
2
5

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
R
ej
ec
t?
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
L
T
A
-D
E
x
p
on
en
ti
al
(2
P
)
G
am
m
a(
3P
)
L
og
n
or
m
al
(3
P
)
W
ei
b
u
ll
(3
P
)
S
am
p
le
si
ze
5
5
5
5
S
ta
ti
st
ic
6.
06
6
4.
33
1
0.
27
66
3.
57
6
R
an
k
8
7
1
6

0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
0:
20
j0:
10
j0:
05
j0:
02
j0:
01
C
ri
ti
ca
l
V
al
u
e
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
1:
37
j1:
93
j2:
50
j3:
29
j3:
91
R
ej
ec
t?
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
N
ojN
ojN
ojN
ojN
o
Y
es
jY
es
jY
es
jY
es
jN
o
71
Fig. 18. Probability-probability (P-P) plot of pump repair time tting to lognormal
distribution.
Fig. 19. Probability-probability (P-P) plot of CV repair time tting to lognormal dis-
tribution.
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Fig. 20. Probability-probability (P-P) plot of LT repair time tting to lognormal dis-
tribution.
Fig. 21. Quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot of pump repair time tting to lognormal distri-
bution.
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Fig. 22. Quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot of CV repair time tting to lognormal distribu-
tion.
Fig. 23. Quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot of LT repair time tting to lognormal distribu-
tion.
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Fig. 24. Probability dierence graph of pump repair time tting to lognormal distri-
bution.
Fig. 25. Probability dierence graph of CV repair time tting to lognormal distribu-
tion.
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Fig. 26. Probability dierence graph of LT repair time tting to lognormal distribu-
tion.
Fig. 27. Scheme of DORA probabilistic model.
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Fig. 28. Component abnormal event probability vs. dierent distribution types to
characterize pump repair time as DORA probabilistic modeling input.
It is shown in Figure 27 that the paths to compute probability of component ab-
normal event and probability of operation out-of-control upon individual component
abnormal event are independent of each other. The uncertainty on the component
State 3 sojourn time distribution type would change the probability of operation
out-of-control only by aecting the probability of component abnormal event.
Through Monte Carlo simulation, the probability of the pump, CV, and LT
abnormal event are computed using dierent component State 3 sojourn time distri-
bution as inputs as shown in Figures 28, 29, and 30.
As shown in the results, the selection among lognormal and lognormal (3P) for
pump repair time distribution has no signicant impact on studying the probability
of overow in the oil/gas separator in the case study. The same conclusion is made
for the selection among exponential, gamma, lognormal and Weibull distributions for
CV repair time, and the selection among exponential, gamma, lognormal, lognormal
(3P) and Weibull distribution for LT repair time.
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Fig. 29. Component abnormal event probability vs. dierent distribution types to
characterize CV repair time as DORA probabilistic modeling input.
Fig. 30. Component abnormal event probability vs. dierent distribution types to
characterize LT repair time as DORA probabilistic modeling input.
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E. Summary
The DORA methodology presented in this Chapter provides a complete frame-
work for dynamic operational risk assessment in oil/gas and chemical industries. The
quantitative analysis development focuses on the DORA Probabilistic Modeling step
and the uncertainty characterization in Incident Consequence Modeling step. Algo-
rithms are designed for the specic goals. The probabilistic modeling uses stochastic
process and process dynamics to study the operational risk of a dynamic process with
standard computational space storage and time consumption. The objective is not
to assess whether a sequence of component failures will cause the system to fail or
not. This methodology aims to assess the probability of the operational failure of a
system. The DORA methodology also aids in incident prevention as it studies the
system degraded behavior due to component abnormal event before a failure actually
occurs. The dynamic modeling provides us a simulation tool to study the process
dynamics in the presence of the possibility that a protection system malfunctions.
The outcomes of DORA probabilistic modeling applied to the level control case
study provide signicant insight for further component inspection interval optimiza-
tion. The control valve is preliminarily identied as the most critical component to the
overow scenario and level transmitter to dryout scenario. More industry inspection
scheduling cost data is needed for further component inspection interval optimization
study. The optimization will be discussed in Chapter IV. In the sensitivity analy-
sis, the component State 3 sojourn time was characterized by tting distributions to
the limited industrial data. Four time-to-repair distribution types widely applied in
reliability engineering and used in this study are exponential distribution, gamma dis-
tribution, lognormal distribution, and Weibull distribution. Two distributions with
dierent number of parameters from each distribution type were selected as the t-
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ting candidates. Goodness-of-t measurement results show that pump and LT repair
time data t to lognormal distribution with three parameters the best and CV repair
time data t to lognormal distribution the best. Uncertainty associated with the
component State 3 sojourn time distribution type was reduced by ranking the tting
hypothesis using chi-square test, K-S test, and A-D test. Sensitivity analysis results
show that the probability of operation out-of-control has no signicant response to
the component repair time distribution model chosen as the DORA inputs in this
level control system in the oil/gas separator case study. This conclusion does not
mean that any distribution type could be selected as DORA input. On the contrary,
the uncertainty and sensitivity analysis proposed in this paper should be performed
for any other DORA probabilistic modeling to achieve a desirable quality of risk
assessment.
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CHAPTER III
UNCERTAINTY CHARACTERIZATION AND REDUCTION IN QRA
A. Introduction
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) in the oil/gas and chemical industries aims
to quantify risk as a function of occurrence probabilities and consequences of ma-
jor accident scenarios. System component failure rates used in point values from
laboratory or generic data have generally been accepted in the past by industry to
estimate the system failure occurrence probabilities in a QRA. However, this practice
includes uncertainty and may mislead the QRA evaluation as well as the subsequent
decision-making. As the results of QRA provide information to prevent losses in ma-
jor accident hazards and aid in many decisions on risk management, it is important
to increase accuracy of the results. Uncertainty is a broad and general term used to
characterize a variety of various concepts including indeterminacy, judgment, approx-
imation, linguistic imprecision, error, and signicance[67]. A discussion of uncertainty
is critical for the risk characterization in order to fully evaluate the implications and
limitations of the risk assessment[68], evaluate how close the assessment is from real-
ity and how the risk is reliably identied, in order to make critical chemical process
safety design decisions.
In a simple and commonly used reliability model, the failure rate of a component
is assumed to be constant. The variation of the failure rates of the same piece of
equipment but from dierent reliability information resources belongs to aleatory
Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from "Uncertainty Reduction for
Improved Mishap Probability Prediction: Application to Level Control of Distillation
Unit" by Xiaole Yang, William J. Rogers, and M. SamMannan, 2009. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, vol. 22, pp. 1-8, Copyright[2009] by Elsevier.
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uncertainty category that is irreducible; however the epistemic uncertainty on the
failure rates can be reduced using Bayesian theory by updating the parameter(s) of
the reliability models. In Bayesian updating, the probability distribution represents
our knowledge and uncertainty about the optimum value of parameter(s). Our prior
knowledge about the failure rates is combined with observation and test evidence,
which is the plant specic real life reliability data used in this study, to gain a posterior
distribution. As our knowledge of the component reliability increases, the uncertainty
of prediction on incident occurrence probability is reduced by continually updating
the component failure rate distribution parameters.
In this Chapter, probabilistic approach will be proposed to characterize aleatory
uncertainty. Bayesian approach will be used to reduce the epistemic uncertainty in a
QRA study.
B. Literature Review
The risk assessment community distinguishes dierent types of uncertainty as
either aleatory uncertainty or epistemic uncertainty[69]. Aleatory uncertainty is due
to randomness and is irreducible in principle. Vagueness arises from natural ran-
domness and unpredictable variation in the performance of the system components
under assessment, such as the variation in atmosphere conditions and the variation in
fatigue life of compressor and turbine blades. Aleatory uncertainty is typically incor-
porated into a QRA with an experimental design based on importance sampling[70].
On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty results from inadequate information or in-
complete knowledge about the behavior of system components under assessment, such
as unknown modeling parameters. Distinctive from aleatory uncertainty, epistemic
uncertainty is reducible by increasing the information/knowledge of the system. In
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a dierent way for uncertainty categorization, it is also helpful to distinguish uncer-
tainty according to where it originates. The sources of uncertainty include: statistical
variation, subjective judgment, linguistic imprecision, variability, inherent random-
ness, disagreement, incomplete/imprecise data/information, approximation and so
forth.
The importance of uncertainty characterization was earlier emphasized by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: "The Commission is aware that uncertain-
ties are not caused by the use of quantitative methodology in decision making but
are merely highlighted through use of the quantication process. Condence in the
use of probabilistic and risk assessment techniques has steadily improved. In fact,
through the quantitative techniques, important uncertainties have been and continue
to be brought into better focus and may even be reduced compared with those that
would remain with a sole reliance on deterministic decision making. To the extent
practicable the Commission intends to ensure that the quantitative techniques used
for regulatory decision making take into account the potential uncertainties that ex-
ist so that an estimate can be made on the condence level to be ascribed to the
quantitative results."[71]
The classical method, referring to the statistical method, is working with mea-
surement uncertainty. This statistical method determines the randomness and sys-
tematic errors by calculating standard deviations, condence intervals, and other
statistical parameters. An elaborate discussion on measurement uncertainty analysis
can be found in the U.S./ISO guide[72] and in the NIST (National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology) guide[73]. In these guidelines, two types of uncertainty eval-
uation were discussed: uncertainty evaluation based on any valid statistical method
for treating data and uncertainty evaluation based on scientic judgement. The valid
statistical methods include: calculating the standard deviation of the mean of a se-
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ries of independent observation, least squares method to t a curve to data for model
parameter estimation and standard deviation estimation, variance analysis to iden-
tify and quantify random eects in certain kinds of measurements, etc. However,
scientic judgement includes previous measurement data, experience, manufacturers
specications, and calibration reports.
The application of modern probabilistic theories for the characterization of un-
certainty was discussed in reliability engineering, risk analysis, and system safety
analysis[74, 75]. Probabilistic approaches are applied in the case that we can assume
the model structure is accurate[76]. The central limit theorem can be implemented
for propagation of distributions. The theorem is stated as the distribution function of
the sum of a suciently large number of independent variables approaches the normal
distribution[77]. Approximation methods based on Taylor series expansion, such as
statistical error propagation, are used to propagate the mean and other central mo-
ments of random variables through a model. However information regarding the tails
of each input distribution is not considered in those approximation methods. In prob-
abilistic risk assessment (PRA) eld, methods for the propagation of the uncertainty
on the basic events through the quantication process, to generate a characterization
of uncertainty on the output of the assessment are established[78]. The uncertainties
on parameters are generally characterized by probability distributions, and the most
used technique is Monte Carlo method[79, 80, 81]. The acceptance and application of
Bayesian theorem[82] has been increased for probabilistic estimation combining prior
information about the system under analysis and likelihood function which usually
could be testing or observation data. A Bayesian reliability assessment procedure for
complex systems in binomial sampling proposed by Cole[83]. A Bayesian reliability
analysis of series systems of binomial subsystems and components was presented by
Martz et al.[84] Rubost Bayesian analysis was proposed by Berger for the applica-
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tion where sets of prior distributions and sets of likelihood functions are considered
instead of single prior distribution and single likelihood function[85, ?]. Zhang and
Mahadevan proposed a Bayesian procedure to quantify the modeling uncertainty and
the uncertainty in distribution parameters[86]. Forest et al.[87] applied Bayes' theo-
rem to quantify the uncertainties in climate system properties with the use of recent
climate observation.
A number of alternative mathematical structures for the representation of un-
certainty have been proposed, including fuzzy set theory, evidence theory and possi-
bility theory. Fuzzy set theory was rst introduced in 1965 by Zadeh[88]. Fuzzy
sets imprecisely dene classes of sets to describe the uncertainty or imprecision
that are non-statistical in nature but play an important role in the processes and
communication[89]. Vague concepts can be dened in a mathematical sense in fuzzy
set theory. A membership function is assigned to a set. All the sets are mapped
into the entire unit interval [0; 1] and the value of the membership function of a set
indicates the degree to which this objective satises the properties of the set. Fuzzy
sets application is discussed in several texts[90, 91, 92, 93]. Evidence theory[94, 95,
96, 97, 98, 99] provides two specications of the uncertainty associated with a set of
possible analysis inputs or results: a belief and a plausibility. The belief provides a
measure of the extent to which the available information implies that the true value is
contained in the set under consideration, whereas the plausibility provides a measure
of the extent to which the available information implies that the true value might be
contained in the set under consideration[100]. The belief and plausibility interpret the
smallest possible probability and largest possible probability for the set that is con-
sistent with all available information. The plausibility of something being true plus
the belief in it not being true is equal to one. Therefore, evidence theory is viewed as
a logic independent of probability theory for reasoning under uncertainty[?]. While
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evidence theory is tied to probability theory, another alternative to probabilistic ap-
proach, possibility theory, is more closely tied to fuzzy set theory[101, 102]. Possibility
theory[103] involves two specications of likelihood for the representation of uncer-
tainty: a necessity and a possibility. Like evidence theory, the sum of necessity and
possibility equals to one.
C. Uncertainty Reduction by Bayesian Updating in Risk Prediction
In this Section, probabilistic approach is used to characterize uncertainty associ-
ated with a QRA. Bayesian theory is applied to reduce the risk prediction uncertainty
by enhancing our knowledge on the reliability of the system. In the remainder of the
Section, Bayesian updating method will be discussed and a case study on knockout
drum in a distillation unit will be used to illustrate the method proposed.
1. Methodology
In probability theory, the Bayesian theorem relates the conditional and marginal
probabilities of two random events. This theorem is often used to compute posterior
probabilities given observations. The posterior probability density function (pdf) for
a continuous random variable  is given by:
f(jt) = h()l(tj)R1
 1 h()l(tj)d
(3.1)
where h() is a continuous prior pdf of , and l(jt) is the likelihood information based
on sample data. In order to keep reliability information updated by the increased
knowledge on the system under assessment, we use the failure rates data from the
OREDA database as prior information and onsite equipment real life reliability data
as the likelihood information. As we keep updating the failure rates of equipment,
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we gain increased knowledge about the equipment reliability.
a. Prior Distribution
Reliability data are usually provided as component failure modes and rates and
used as the input of risk assessment models, such as fault tree/event tree analysis.
Instead of point values, the input reliability data for this study are all presented as
distributions. Since the failure rates in the available databases or handbooks are from
generic data or similar plants, they are not signicantly representative for the specic
case under assessment; but they are sound enough to be used as prior distribution
for the further Bayesian updating.
OREDA2002[59] is one of the major resources of reliability data for oshore reli-
ability analysis. OREDA2002 collects reliability data from multiple companies. The
variation from multi-samples is described by a gamma distribution with parameters
given in the OREDA2002 handbook. The gamma distribution of failure rates in
OREDA is used as prior distribution in this study:
h(;; ) =  1
 e 
1

 ()
(3.2)
b. Likelihood Information
If in a test or eld observation in which there are n exactly same items, r distinct
times failure founded to or between t1 < t2 <    < tr, and n   r times normal
operating observation founded to censoring tc1, tc2,    , tc(n r). The total time T to
detect r times failures of a single item is given by:
T =
rX
i=1
ti +
n rX
i=1
tci (3.3)
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The likelihood function can be written with the exponential distribution assump-
tion on the time between failures:
l(tj) = n ri=1 e tin ri=1 e tci = re T (3.4)
When plant testing data is available, the total testing time and component failure
number will be used to develop likelihood function for each component. However, it
is very common that this testing information is not available prior to a QRA. In the
absence of testing data, the plant real life reliability data is a suitable alternative and
can be used as likelihood information.
c. Posterior Distribution
Substituting equation 3.2 and equation 3.4 into Bayesian theory(equation 3.1),
the posterior distribution of failure rates is given by:
f(jT ) = e
 (T+ 1

)r+ 1R1
0
e (T+
1

)r+ 1d
(3.5)
By the denition of gamma function:Z 1
0
r+ 1e(T+
1

)d =
 (+ r)
(T + 1

)+r
(3.6)
Finally, the posterior pdf of  is rewritten as:
f(jT ) = (T +
1

)+r
 (+ r)
+r 1e (T+
1

) (3.7)
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2. Case Study II - Flammable Liquid Overlling from a Knockout Drum of the
Distillation Unit
The objective of this subsection is to apply a probabilistic quantitative risk assess-
ment on a knockout drum of the distillation unit, analyze the uncertainty associated
with the risk evaluation, reduce the uncertainty through Bayesian updating on the
component reliability data and guide process safety design.
In petroleum reneries, petrochemical and chemical plants, and natural gas
processing plants, continuous and steady-state fractional distillation is widely used.
Henry Kister, a distillation tower expert, analyzed recent trends in distillation tower
malfunctions from 900 cases, and found that half of the tower base malfunctions in-
volved high liquid levels[104]. The U. K. Health and Safety Executive reported that
overow was the second leading cause in analysis of 718 loss of containment incidents
for vessels[105]. As part of a distillation unit, a knockout drum (KO drum) is an
empty vessel where vapor-liquid separation takes place. Many of the accidents and
unit upsets associated with KO drums negatively aect petroleum reneries. Liquid
overlling incidents in vapor-liquid separation vessels, which carried to high conse-
quences, occurred in the past decades. For example, BPs Texas City Renery incident
on March 23, 2005 occurred during the start-up, following a temporary outage of the
isomerization Unit (ISOM) and involved an explosion and res which killed 15 work-
ers and injured more than 170 others. The incident was investigated exhaustively
in the nal investigation report released on the CSB website. (http://www.csb.gov).
Kister similarly concluded that faulty level measurement and control are the primary
cause of tower high level events, as seen in BP ISOM incident[5, 106]. The case study
in this subsection focuses on a fault tree analysis on liquid overlling a KO drum in a
distillation unit and uncertainty analysis associated with the probability estimation.
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Fig. 31. Process ow diagram of the distillation unit with a knockout drum.
a. Fault Tree Development
A simplied process ow diagram in Figure 31 is used to demonstrate the process.
A fault tree developed to analyze the overlling of KO drum is shown in Figure 32
The Boolean logic expression of the top event is given by:
T = A
\
f(F
[
C)
[
[(D
[
C
[
B)
[
(A1
\
A2
\
E)]g (3.8)
where: T - Flammable liquid overlling from the KO drum
A - LAH(Level Alarm High) fails
A1 - LAH1(Level Alarm High) fails
A2 - LAH2(Level Alarm High) fails
B - V-4 fails to open
C - Piping blockage
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Fig. 32. Fault tree of ammable liquid overlling from knockout drum in the distilla-
tion unit.
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D - Pump 3 fails
E - LT(Level Transmitter) fails
F - F-6 fails to open
With the assumption that LAH, LAH1, and LAH2 share the same failure rate
data, the probability of ammable liquid overlling from the KO drum, is given by:
Ptop event = [(PF + PC) + (PD + PC + PB) + P 2A  PE] PA (3.9)
b. Uncertainty Reduction through Bayesian Updating
OREDA2002 and CCPS(Center for Chemical Process of Safety)[107] handbook
are the two major sources of the reliability data for this study. OREDA2002 data
was introduced in the previous section. CCPS handbook obtains reliability data by
conducting a literature search and an industry survey. The lognormal distribution
is chosen in the CCPS handbook due to the general shape, popularity among data
analysts, and ease of calculation[107]. The lognormal distribution parameter infor-
mation is insucient in CCPS handbook. Therefore, dierent failure rate lognormal
distribution parameter  values of Piping blockage and LT fails were assumed in a
set of experiments to study the impact of input uncertainty on output uncertainty.
Reliability data for all the basic events used as the rst set of prior function in this
study are shown in Table XIII.
We assume that the Bayesian updating interval is two years in this case study.
Thus, the updating interval and component failure number detected within the two
years are the likelihood information for Bayesian updating. For two basic events,
Piping blockage and LT fails, the real life reliability data is not available. So their
prior distributions will be directly used as the input without any Bayesian updating.
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All the likelihood information is summarized in Table XIV.
Three continual updatings were conducted in the case study. The posterior
distribution after each updating is used as prior distribution for the next updating.
In doing so, all the available information about the component reliability is included
to update the failure rate distribution parameters. Through Bayesian updating, the
uncertainty is reduced. The prior distribution parameters, likelihood information,
and updated posterior distribution parameters of equipment used for this analysis
can be also found in Table XIV. And the Bayesian updating distribution graphs are
shown in Figure 33.
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Fig. 33. Prior distribution and posterior distributions for failure rates of LAH, pump,
V-4, and V-6.
96
Bayesian Updating on Basic Event Probability Distribution Parame-
ters
The real life reliability data provided likelihood information to update the failure
rate distributions (Figure 33). As shown in Figure 33, after being updated, component
failure rate pdf curves changed their shape from the prior pdf curve and all the
updated curves shifted upon each updating. Through the updating, all of the three
new 
0
parameters of posterior gamma distributions of LAH failure rate, pump failure
rate, and V-6 failure rate were one order of magnitude higher than the prior ; All
the three new 
0
parameters of posterior gamma distributions of V-6 failure rate
and the last two times updated 
0
parameters of V-4 failure rate were one order
of magnitude lower than the prior  (Table XIV). Therefore, our knowledge on
component failure rates is enhanced and more accurate QRA results are expected
using renewed information.
Uncertainty in Top Event Probability Aected by Input Probability
Uncertainty
Due to insucient testing data or real life reliability data for piping and LT,
their prior lognormal distributions were used directly as the inputs for the top event
probability calculation. In order to study the eect of input (basic events of piping
blockage and LT fails) uncertainty on the output (top event), dierent  values of
the input lognormal distribution were used. As shown in Figure 34, at the same time
point, the 5th year since the prior evaluation, both mean value and standard deviation
of the top event probability changed as the  value changed. In Figure 35, a plot
of upper, lower, mean and SD of top event probability distribution vs. dierent 
values of the lognormal distributions of input basic events illustrates: when  < 1, the
risk estimation is considered accurate as there is no signicant dierence between the
upper value line and lower value line; and the SD is converged to zero; when  > 1,
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Fig. 34. Top event probabilities simulated using dierent  values of failure rate dis-
tributions of piping blockage and LT fails. The basic event failure rate distri-
butions used to generate the graphs are the second posterior distributions at
the 5th year since the prior evaluation.
98
Fig. 35. Uncertainty of the top event probability distribution vs. parameter  of the
basic events (piping blockage and LT fails) probability distributions.
the upper-lower range increased, and the SD of the top event probability estimation
was increased by the raising  values of two input lognormal distributions (piping
blockage and LT fails). Therefore, the uncertainty associated with the input of our
QRA has a signicant impact on the top event probability estimation accuracy.
Probability Prediction Uncertainty Reduction by Bayesian Updating
Assuming the lifetime of this process unit is about 25 years, the probability
of ammable liquid release is changing over time due to the lifetime of equipment
performance. We calculated four predictions on ammable liquid release probability
throughout the system lifetime using the four sets of basic event probabilities dis-
tribution parameters. The four predictions were based on one prior information set,
and the other three posterior distributions parameter sets upon Bayesian updating
shown in Table XIV. Figure 36 shows the prediction on mean value of ammable
liquid release probability distribution over time with  = 0 for the lognormal proba-
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Fig. 36. Predictions on mean value of ammable liquid release probability using con-
tinually updating failure rates distribution.
bility distribution of piping blockage and LT fails. The mean values of the probability
increased over time due to the deterioration of the equipment. Figure 37 shows the
uncertainty of the four predictions. The four mean value prediction curves overlapped
among each other (Figure 36), but the predictions based on updated failure rates in-
formation had lower uncertainty than the prediction based on the prior information
(Figure 37). The conclusion is that the accumulated information about component
failure rates increased our knowledge on the system performance and the uncertainty
of the estimation has been reduced.
D. Summary
At all levels, the understanding of uncertainty associated with risk of major chem-
ical industrial hazards should be enhanced. This Chapter aims to draw attention to
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Fig. 37. Uncertainty proles associated with the four top event probability predictions.
uncertainty characterization and reduction using probabilistic approaches. The fault
tree analysis on case study II identied ve minimum cut sets for the top event of
ammable liquid overlling from knockout drum in the distillation unit. They are:
(LAH fails, V-6 fails to open), (LAH fails, piping blockage), (LAH fails, pump fails),
(LAH fails, V-4 fails to open), and (LAH fails, LT fails). LAH fails was identied as
the most critical issue to initiate a ammable liquid overlling. This FTA conclusion
conrms that level measurement and control is a primary cause for a high level inci-
dent. The FTA results showed that the probability of this top event increases over
time. The uncertainty analysis revealed that: 1) the aleatory uncertainty of failure
rates from various data resources can be eciently characterized by probability dis-
tributions, and further used to propagate the output uncertainty through a fault tree
analysis model. 2) uncertainty of inputs (basic event probabilities) has a signicant
impact on the uncertainty of output (top event probability) in a QRA. In this study,
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uncertainty analysis proves that more information on the piping blockage and level
transmitter failure is needed to improve the accuracy of further QRA; 3) uncertainty
of the top event probability prediction is reduced by Bayesian updating of the com-
ponent failure rates using real life reliability data at the absence of component testing
data.
The approaches presented in this Chapter, Monte Carlo simulations to get a
probability distribution instead of point values and Bayesian updating using real life
reliability data to enhance our knowledge on the system continually, provide industry
a tool to characterize and reduce uncertainty for improving overall mishap probability
prediction.
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CHAPTER IV
COMPONENT INSPECTION INTERVAL OPTIMIZATION
A. Introduction
Preventive maintenance is undertaken regularly at predetermined intervals in
order to reduce or eliminate accumulated deterioration of the system[108]. In most of
the current maintenance practices, the frequency of testing, inspection, and repair is
determined by the component maintenance history. Scheduled component inspections
play an important role in maintenance program because they provide a means to
discover dormant failures and/or degradation before it leads to catastrophe. As with
other maintenance activities, it is crucial to determine the appropriate inspection
schedule to meet certain performance expectations of the system. From an operational
risk point of view, the inspection schedule should be able to detect system degradation
before process variables, e.g., temperature, pressure, and level, exceed desired bounds
and abnormal events occur.
It is widely recognized that the decision on inspection scheduling is a series of
compromises among performance, risk, cost, and quality attributes, etc. In con-
ventional approaches to inspection planning, various inspection criteria, such as fa-
tigue lives, member criticality, stress levels, past inspection data, previous experi-
ence, etc., are combined qualitatively to produce the optimal inspection plan[109].
Reliability/risk-based inspection planning techniques were developed in a quantita-
tive manner through the use of probabilistic functions which take into account the un-
certainties associated with the parameters that determine component reliability[110,
111, 112, 113]. There are several industrial guidelines and techniques, such as API 580
- Risk-based Inspection in petroleum industry[114] and Reliability Centered Mainte-
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nance (RCM)[115], to help make decisions on the inspection intervals. Cost is usually
treated as a constraint. However, in practical risk assessment, overall risk and inspec-
tion cost are conicting objectives. It is more reasonable to perform a multiobjective
optimization that rigorously considers these objectives.
This Chapter deals with component inspection interval optimization of the oil/
gas separation system in oshore plants described in Chapter II. In this Chapter,
we propose a set of Pareto optimal solutions focusing on the inspection scheduling
of pump, control valve, and level transmitter in the system. A numerical pareto
optimization technique based on an evolutionary algorithm and scaler method in
which a scaling factor is used to represent the weights of trade-o objectives are
used in this Chapter. Pareto optimal curves were generated to represent the optimal
inspection budget and scheduling. The results show that both methods are favorable
to identify the pareto set of the problem prior to a nal decision on what component
inspection interval of the system should be selected.
B. Literature Review
As the name suggests, a multiobjective optimization problem (MOOP) deals
with a vector of objective functions to be minimized or maximized. In single objective
optimization, the goal is to nd a solution or solutions that optimize the sole objective
function. Decision space is the only search space when solving a single objective
optimization problem. However, a multiobjective optimization problem deals with
two search spaces, decision space and objective space. This is one of the striking
dierences between single objective and multiobjective optimization problems[116].
These two spaces are linked by a unique mapping that is often nonlinear. Figure
38 illustrates the two search spaces in a two objective functions optimization and a
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Fig. 38. Representation of the decision space and the corresponding objective space.
mapping between them. A multiobjective optimization problem can be stated as:
minJ(x;p)
s:t:g(x;p)  0
h(x;p) = 0
xi;l  xi  xi;u(i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n) (4.1)
where J is the objective function vector. x is the decision vector and p is the xed
parameter vector. g and h are the inequality and equality constraints. xi;l and xi;u
are the lower and upper boundaries of the ith design variable.
Pareto optimality was rst introduced into engineering and sciences in 1970s by
Stadler[117]. The Pareto-optimal set is a non-dominated set in which the members
are not dominated by any member of a set of solutions[116]. If the non-dominated
set is valid for the entire feasible search space, this non-dominated set is the global
Pareto-optimal set. Otherwise, a local Pareto-optimal set is dened as:
If for every member x in a set P there exists no solution y (in the neighborhood of x
such that ky  xk1  , where  is a small positive number) dominating any member
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Fig. 39. Pareto-optimal sets are marked in the bold continuous curves for four dierent
scenarios in a two objectives optimization problem.
of the set P , then solutions belonging to the set P constitute a locally Pareto-optimal
set [118, 119].
On many occasions, the Pareto-optimal set refers to the global Pareto-optimal
set since solutions of this set are not dominated by any feasible member of the search
space so that they are optimal solutions of the multiobjective optimization problem.
Figure 39 illustrates the continuous Pareto curves in four dierent scenarios for a two
objective optimization problem. The solutions in the Pareto-optimal set are all on a
particular edge of the feasible search region.
In the past decades, classical methods for solving multiobjective functions have
been developed. Cohon[120] classied those algorithms into two types:
 Generating methods: a few non-dominated solutions are generated without
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a priori knowledge of relative importance of each objective for the decision-
makers.
 Preference-based methods: some known preference for each objective is used in
this method.
The simplest and most widely used method for multiobjective optimization is
the weighted sum method. This method belongs to Cohon's preference-based method
category because it uses perference information in the optimization process. Weighted
sum method transfers a multiobjective optimization problem into an aggregated single
objective optimization problem weighting each individual objective. The aggregated
objective function is given by:
Jweightedsum = w1J1 + w2J2 + w3J3:::+ wnJn (4.2)
where wi(i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n) is a weighting factor for the ith objective function Ji. For
a single objective formulation, the weights are selected in proportion to the relative
importance of each individual objective in the problem. Each point on the Pareto
curve is an optimization solution corresponding to a particular set of values for the
weights. The weighted sum method adjusts the weights systematically in order to
traverse the Pareto curve.
Initial work on weighted sum method can be found in Zadeh's publication in
1963[121]. The advantage of this method is due to its simplicity. Its concept is
intuitive and easy to implement. This method guarantees nding the entire Pareto-
optimal solution set for problems having a convex Pareto-optimal front. However, the
disadvantages were also discussed in a number of studies[122, 123, 124]. First of all,
the Pareto-optimal solutions are not uniformly distributed. It is dicult to set the
weight vectors to obtain a Pareto-optimal solution in a desired region in the objec-
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tive space. Moreover, weighted sum method fails to nd the Pareto-optimal solution
in the case of an non-convex objective space. In AWS method, additional inequal-
ity constraints are imposed in the usual weighted sum method. The optimization is
performed only in a newly-dened feasible region where more exploration is needed.
The AWS method produces well-distributed solutions and nds Pareto-optimal so-
lutions in non-convex regions. However, AWS method is only applied in the case of
two objective functions which refers to bi-objective adapted weighted sum method.
The same authors published adapted weighted sum method for multiobjective op-
timization in 2006[125]. Instead of inequality constraints in bi-objective problem,
additional equality constraints are imposed to connect the pseudo-nadir point and
the expected locations of Pareto-optimal solutions on the piecewise linearized plane
in the objective space. Suboptimizations are performed for further renement along
equality constraint lines to determine solutions near desired positions, which leads to
a well-distributed mesh representation of the Pareto.
The -Constraint method was proposed by Marglin[126] in 1967. Haimes et
al.[127] in 1971 suggested reformulating MOOP in order to alleviate the diculties
in solving non-convex objective spaces in weighted sum method, by just keeping one
of the objectives and restricting the rest of them within user-supplied values:
minJ(x; p)
s:t:Jm(x; p)  m
g(x; p)  0
h(x; p) = 0
xi;l  xi  xi;u(i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n) (4.3)
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where m represents an upper bound of the value of Jm but not necessarily a small
value close to zero. The advantage of -Constraint method is that it can be applied
for any arbitrary problem either having convex or non-convex objective spaces. On
the other hand, the disadvantage of this method depends on how much information
is obtained from the user. As the number of objectives increases, there are more
elements in  vector so that more information is required from users. In addition,
elements in  vector have to be chosen within the minimum or maximum values of
the individual objective function. Otherwise, there exists no feasible solution to the
optimization problem.
The goal programming methods were rst introduced in single objective linear
programming problem by Charnes et al. in 1955[128]. After the work of Lee[129],
Ignizio[130, 131], and many others, goal programming methods became more popular.
Romero[132] has presented a comprehensive overview of the goal programming tech-
niques and their application in engineering[133, 134]. In goal programming method,
the goal is to to nd solutions which attain a predened target for one or more ob-
jective functions. If there exists a solution with the desired target, the task of goal
programming is to identify this particular solution. On the other hand, if there is no
solution which achieves predetermined targets in all objective functions, the task is
to nd solutions which minimize the deviations from the predened targets.
Interactive methods are another alternative. As some Pareto-optimal solutions
are found, their location and interactions are analyzed. Some of the most popular in-
teractive methods include: interactive surrogate worth trade-o (ISWT) method[135],
step method[136], reference point method[137], guess method[138], nondierentiable
interactive multi-objective bundle-based optimization system (NIMBUS) approach[139],
and light beam search method[140].
There are some other classical methods to solve multiobjective optimization prob-
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lems. Weighted Tchebyche metric methods[119], Benson's method[141, 142], the
value function method[119], etc. All the classical methods described above are based
on a similar premise, namely, converting a multiobjective optimization problem into a
sequence of single objective optimization problem. However, diculties are observed
in those methods[116]:
 One simulation in the classical algorithm run can nd only one Pareto-optimal
solution.
 Some classical algorithms fail to nd all Pareto-optimal solutions in non-convex
multiobjective optimization problems.
 All classical algorithms require some prior knowledge.
Thinking on the disadvantages stated above, it would not be surprising that
a number of non-classical, unorthodox and stochastic search and optimization algo-
rithms have been developed over the past decades. Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) for
MOOP are inspired by biological evolution such as inheritance, mutation, selection,
and crossover, etc, and drives the search towards an optimal solution in a process
which mimics nature's evolutionary principles. Over the last decade, genetic algo-
rithms (GAs) have been extensively used in science, commerce and engineering. In
GAs, a population of abstract representations (called chromosomes or the genotype)
of candidate solutions (called phenotypes) to an optimization problem evolves toward
better solutions. Genetic algorithm was rst introduced by John Holland[143]. The
genetic algorithms can be found in several textbooks[143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148], and
a more comprehensive description in a compiled handbook[149]. The major journals
that are now dedicated to promote research on GA include: 'Evolutionary Computa-
tion Journal' published by MIT Press, 'Transactions on Evolutionary Computation'
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published by IEEE and 'Genetic Programming and Evolvable Machines' published
by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Several widely used evolutionary algorithms are listed here:
 Vector Evaluated Genetc Algorithm (VEGA)[150] is a straightforward extension
of a single objective GA for multiobjective optimization. In a MOOP which
has N objectives, VEGA divides GA populations into N equal subpopulations
randomly at every generation. Fitness is assigned to each subpopulation based
on dierent objective function. In doing so, each of the N objectives is used to
evaluate some members in the population.
 Weighted-Based Genetic Algorithm (WBGA)[151] is a weighted-based algo-
rithm. Each objective function is multiplied by a weighting factor. The tness
of a solution is calculated based on the weighted objective function values. How-
ever, each individual in a GA population is assigned a dierent weighting vector.
In this way, one simulation run can nd multiple Pareto-optimal solutions.
 Multiple Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA)[152] is the rst algorithm to
emphasize non-dominated solutions and meanwhile maintains diversity in the
non-dominated solutions. The tness value is assigned to each solution in the
population. That is the dierence of the MOGA from a classical GA, but the
rest is the same.
 Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA)[144, 153] is one of the rst
evolutionary algorithms. The tness assignment procedure initiates from the
rst non-dominated set and successively proceeds to dominated sets. The main
advantage of an NSGA is that tness is assigned according to non-dominated
sets. Therefore, the selection procedure in an NSGA progresses towards the
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Pareto-optimal front. Moreover, performing sharing in the design space can
nd phenotypically diverse solutions when using NSGAs. However, criticisms
on NSGA were stated by Deb et al.[154]: high computational complexity of
non-dominated sorting, lack of elitism, and need for specifying the sharing pa-
rameter.
 Niched-Pareto Genetic Algorithm (NPGA)[155] was proposed based on the non-
domination concept. VEGAs, NSGAs, and MOGAs use proportionate selection
method for the selection operator, while NPGAs use binary tournament selec-
tion as they have better growth and convergence properties compared to pro-
portionate selction.
 Elitist Non-Dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II)[154] uses an ex-
plicit diversity-preserving mechanism instead of using only an elite-preservation
strategy as in algorithms described above. The crowded comparison selection
operator in NSGA-II selects the best solutions in a mating pool created by
combining the parent and child populations. NSGA-II becomes more popular
due to its low computational requirements, elitist approach, and parameter-less
sharing approach.
 Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm (SPEA)[156] is also an elitist evolu-
tionary algorithm which explicitly maintains a xed size of external population.
This population stores a set of non-dominated solutions and the solutions are
compared to newly found non-dominated solutions at every generation. The
resulting non-dominated solutions are preserved.
 Pareto-Archived Evolution Strategy (PAES)[157] is a (1+1) evolution algorithm
which employs local search and uses a reference archive of previously found
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solutions for a place in an elite population. Elitism is ensured by the 'plus'
strategy and the continuous update of an external archive with better solutions.
Comparison of multi-objective evolutionary algorithms can be found in Zitzler,
Deb and Thiele's studies[158, 159], Veldhuizen's study[160], Knowles and Corne's
study[157], Deb, Agrawal, Pratap and Meyarivan's study[154], etc.
C. Case Study III - Component Inspection Interval Optimization in the Oil/Gas
Separator
In this Section, we perform an optimization study on component inspection inter-
val determination focusing on level control in an oil/ gas separator system. As liquid
overow has been considered one of the major contributors to incidents involving the
vapor-liquid separation system, component inspection interval should be optimized
to reduce the risk of the oil/gas separator overow. There are two objective functions
in the inspection interval optimization problem in this study; one is the operational
risk function in form of probability of separator overow, and the other is the annual
component inspection cost function. There are multiple components involved in the
same system. Given the same total amount of annual inspection budget, multiple
component inspection scheduling plans could be proposed but only one of them is on
the Pareto curve.
1. Optimization Problem Formulation
As mentioned earlier, the objective functions in this multiobjective optimization
problem include risk function that is essentially dened in equation 2.20 and cost
function. The probability of a component becoming abnormal, pn, can be obtained
by simulation using component failure rate data and be used as a set of constant
113
parameters in the optimization. The probability of overow when the component n
goes abnormal is function of component inspection interval. Variable In is dened
as In =
36524
Tn
, where Tn is the actual inspection interval. Eight dierent inspection
intervals, half daily, daily, weekly, monthly, semi-annually, annually, every two years,
and every three years, were used as the inputs for probability simulation to calculate
the probability of overow due to individual component abnormal events. Therefore,
function qIn in equation 2.20 can be obtained by regress of those simulation results to
obtain the relationship between qIn and In. Therefore, the risk function is given by:
f1(I) =
3X
n=1
pnqIn (4.4)
Denote component unit inspection cost as Cn, the cost function is given by:
f2(I) =
3X
n=1
CnIn (4.5)
Generally speaking, inspection can be categorized as operator inspection and me-
chanical inspection. Operator inspection has no impact on failure rate; it is intended
for detecting abnormal event. The cost for operator inspection is usually cheap; it
does not include the cost for mechanical checks and repairs. However, mechanical
inspection inspection does aect failure rate, and it is usually expensive. The cost
function in this study refers to operator inspection only.
The operator inspection cost includes only the actual labor and material required
to inspect plant equipment. It does not include the impact of inspection or mainte-
nance on availability, production capacity, operating costs, product quality and the
myriad of other factors that limit plant eectiveness. The component inspection unit
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cost are approximately given from cost history as:
C1:pump = 141:5$=task (4.6)
C2:CV = 107:5$=task (4.7)
C3:LT = 100$=task (4.8)
The pn is the probability of nth component becoming abnormal. The pns for all
components in the case study were computed using reliability data and listed here:
p1:pump = 0:93 (4.9)
p2:CV = 0:33 (4.10)
p3:LT = 0:14 (4.11)
In order to obtain the qns through regression, eight dierent inspection intervals
for each component in this separator system, pump, CV and LT, are tested: half
day, one day, one week, one month, half year, one year, two years and three years.
The simulation results are shown in Figures 40,41,42. The coecients and r-square
values of the exponential regression are summarized in Table XV. Therefore, the rst
objective function, the probability of separator overow can be written as:
f1(I) = 0:93(0:06211e
 0:003565141:5I1) + 0:33(0:5434e 0:0001924107:5I2 +
0:4534e 5:674e 6107:5I2) + 0:14(0:8047e 9:283e 5100I3) (4.12)
The second objective function, the total annual component inspection cost is
given by:
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Fig. 40. Overow probability due to individual pump abnormal event regression on
annual individual pump inspection cost.
Fig. 41. Overow probability due to individual CV abnormal event regression on an-
nual individual CV inspection cost.
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Fig. 42. Overow probability due to individual LT abnormal event regression on an-
nual individual LT inspection cost.
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f2(I) = 141:5I1 + 107:5I2 + 100I3 (4.13)
2. Optimization Results and Discussion
In the weighted sum method (WSM), a weighting factor, , is introduced to
describe the weights of objective functions under consideration in the optimization.
Thus, this multiobjective optimization problem is transformed to a single objective
problems:
f = (0:93(0:06211e 0:003565141:5I1) + 0:33(0:5434e 0:0001924107:5I2 +
0:4534e 5:674e 6107:5I2) + 0:14(0:8047e 9:283e 5100I3)) +
(1  )(141:5I1 + 107:5I2 + 100I3) (4.14)
The optimization problem is formulated in AMPL[161] and solved using IPOPT[162].
The  value starts from 0:001 and is adjusted at an increment of 0:001 up to 1, and
thus 1000 data points were computed to generated the Pareto curve. This Pareto
curve is presented in Figure 43.
Kanpur Genetic Algorithms Laboratory developed NSGA - II: an evolutionary al-
gorithm for solving multiobjective optimization problem is used in this study. Pareto
curves at dierent generations generated using NSGA -II in C language are shown in
Figure 43. The simulation data points and a Pareto curve generated based on these
points is also shown in Figure 43.
The shape of the curves represents the expected trade-o situation where the
annual total component inspection cost is to be judged against operational risk. The
Pareto curves by both NSGA-II at 500 generation and WSM show a smooth behavior.
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Fig. 43. Pareto curves generated using generic algorithm at dierent generations and
using the WSM.
The lower generation Pareto curves by NSGA-II, as well as all the simulation results
in Figure 43, are above the NSGA-II 500 gen and the WSM Pareto curves. However,
NSGA-II only achieves the local optimal as it failed to nd the optimal solutions in the
entire feasible search space. The WSM Pareto curve and the 500 gen NSGA-II Pareto
curve overlap with each other before the total annual inspection cost exceeds around
200; 000$=yr. Beyond this budget, the WSM optimal solutions are below NSGA-
II Pareto curve. The risk reduction rate before the overow probability decreased
to 0:1 is dramatically larger than that afterwards. Increase the inspection budget
from  175$=yr to  14; 507$=yr and the probability of separator overow will be
reduced by about 2 times from 0:48 to 0:25. A further decrease of the probability from
0:25 to 0:1 requires an increase in the budget of 10 times more to  114; 924$=yr.
However, the risk reduction as a function of increasing inspection budget is relatively
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slow after the overow probability is reduced below 0:1. Doubling the inspection
budget to  231; 023$=yr only reduces the overow probability from 0:1 to 0:05. The
total annual inspection has to be increased to  860; 261$=yr to further decrease the
overow probability to 0:002. The functions and design variables associated with each
solution on the WSM Pareto curve were plotted in Figures 44, 45, 46, and 47. A single
point in function space Figure 44 has a unique mapping to a single point in Figures
45,46,and 47 respectively. The risk is reduced while the inspection intervals of all three
components are monotonically decreasing. However, the inspection intervals for three
components have dierent sensitive zone. Decreasing pump inspection interval has a
linear pattern impact on risk reduction. Inspection interval within 50hr  10hr for
CV is the most sensitive range for risk reduction as in this range risk reduction has
sharper slope than the out of this range. Decreasing the LT inspection interval has
larger impact on the risk reduction when the probability of overow is above 0:25.
Below 0:25, the probability of overow is reduced at a slower pace as the LT inspection
interval decreases. In order to keep probability of overow around or below 0:1, the
inspection intervals of all three components need to be tuned up simultaneously for
better cost eective inspection scheduling.
D. Summary
This Chapter has presented mathematical modeling for assessing the operational
risk, focusing on overow scenario in oil/gas separation system, and optimizing the
component inspection interval in the same system. The weighted sum method and
evolutionary algorithms were utilized to solve the multiobjective optimization prob-
lem. WSM achieved better optimal solutions in an oil/gas separation system, whereas
the evolutionary algorithm only found the local optimal solutions of the inspection
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Fig. 44. The WSM Pareto-optimal solutions in function space.
Fig. 45. Design variable I pump inspection interval associated with the WSM Pare-
to-optimal solutions.
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Fig. 46. Design variable II CV inspection interval associated with the WSM Pareto-op-
timal solutions.
Fig. 47. Design variable III LT inspection interval associated with the WSM Pare-
to-optimal solutions.
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interval optimization problem in this MOOP case study. The results of the opti-
mization process yield an immediate choice of component inspection interval sets for
whatever relative weighting is considered as the most appropriate one for the actual
design problem by the nal decision makers. The pump was identied as the highest
priority component on the inspection interval management for risk reduction in the
oil/gas separation system in the case study.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
The main subject of this dissertation is to improve the current quantitative risk
assessment approaches and develop a methodology for dynamic operational risk as-
sessment in oil/gas and chemical industries. The previous three chapters following the
introduction chapter are self-contained but relative in the same vein of the innovation
in quantitative risk assessment research.
Chapter II is the main contribution of this dissertation. This chapter develops a
complete conceptual DORA framework for quantitative risk assessment of dynamic
processes in oil/gas and chemical industries. This methodology can be implemented as
an ongoing model to guide implementation and continual updating of safety program
components such as risk-based and cost-eective monitoring, testing, maintenance,
reliability assessment, component replacement timing, shutdown times, and timing
of other operational decisions including selection of minimal reliability criteria dur-
ing maintenance shutdowns. The DORA framework emphasizes the importance to
identify hazards, scenarios and component failure mode combinations in the system
in a sequential order. This preliminary analysis on hazardous scenarios and compo-
nent performance consists of the logic structure behind DORA probabilistic modeling.
DORA probabilistic modeling design is the most novel contribution in this chapter.
It well considers the time-dependent factors in a dynamic process, and models the
process using a generic algorithm which is not limited to the currently used Markovian
approaches. The component performance is not modeled by any stochastic models
with many restrictions, such as a Markovian chain or a Semi-Markovian chain with-
out the restriction on exponential distribution on sojourn time. On the contrary,
any component performance process, including the ones carry Markovian properties,
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can be modeled using DORA probabilistic modeling proposed in this dissertation.
Simultaneous component failures also can be detected using the stochastic simulation
in DORA probabilistic modeling. Furthermore, even though the author is not the
rst one to propose the integration of stochastic modeling on component performance
and dynamics modeling on the physical process, the way to achieve this integration
is an innovation. At the steady state, the evolution of process variable is governed by
the same dynamics equation set. However, when the component precursor exists, the
trajectory of process variable does not follow the dynamics equations for steady state
anymore. DORA probabilistic modeling monitors the component precursors and sim-
ulates the probability of operation out of control based on the information predicted
when and only when component abnormal event occurs. In doing this, computa-
tional space is saved. This advantage will be more revealed when DORA is applies to
a complex system. Matlab is the software used for programming in this dissertation
for the level control in oil/gas separator case study. However, since the system in the
case study is relatively small compared to what this method could be apply for, the
programming needs to be improved to achieve faster computation speed for analysis
on more complicated systems. Therefore, recommendations on the future work for
the DORA probabilistic modeling include the application on a complex system and
coding the algorithm using a more advanced computer language to save computation
time.
Uncertainty is an emerging topic in quantitative risk assessment research area
nowadays. Throughout the whole dissertation, uncertainty associated with a QRA
is considered when developing any quantitative modeling in DORA framework. For
example, the inputs of DORA probabilistic modeling are component reliability data
in form of distributions instead of point values, the analysis on uncertainty associ-
ated with selecting distribution type for the DORA probabilistic modeling inputs,
126
and the uncertainty treatment in the consequence modeling in DORA framework,
etc. Algorithm was designed for uncertainty characterization when one applies in-
cident consequence modeling during the implementation of DORA framework. It
was discussed in Chapter II. A more comprehensive discussion on uncertainty char-
acterization and reduction in quantitative risk assessment is discussed in Chapter III.
The contribution of the author in this area is that a Bayesian approach for uncer-
tainty reduction using plant specic real time reliability data for Bayesian updating
is proposed to enhance our knowledge on the system continually, providing industry
a practical tool to characterize and reduce uncertainty for improving overall mishap
probability prediction.
Chapter IV is an extension of Chapter II. Cost-benet analysis is one of the steps
composing DORA framework and is illustrated in Chapter IV by a case study. The
work in Chapter IV shows how one can implement DORA probabilistic modeling for
practical decision making. The recommendation for further optimization work is to
include the cost due to unavailability of the component, the potential prot loss on
the shutdown time due to any repair activities, and the cost due to repair if any
abnormal event is detected, etc. in order to better formulate the cost function. In
this case, excessively more industrial data may needed for the future work.
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APPENDIX A
THE WSM PARETO CURVE
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.001 0.499 7.900E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.002 0.499 7.700E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.003 0.499 7.800E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.004 0.499 8.000E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.005 0.499 8.100E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.006 0.499 8.300E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.007 0.499 8.500E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.008 0.499 8.700E-04 4380000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.009 0.499 8.900E-04 2920000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.01 0.499 9.100E-04 2920000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.011 0.499 9.400E-04 2920000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.012 0.499 9.700E-04 2920000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.013 0.499 1.010E-03 2920000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.014 0.499 1.050E-03 2190000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.015 0.499 1.090E-03 2190000000 4380000000 2920000000
0.016 0.499 1.150E-03 2190000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.017 0.499 1.210E-03 1752000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.018 0.499 1.280E-03 1752000000 2920000000 2920000000
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alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.019 0.499 1.360E-03 1460000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.02 0.499 1.450E-03 1460000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.021 0.499 1.560E-03 1251428571 2920000000 2920000000
0.022 0.499 1.700E-03 1095000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.023 0.499 1.860E-03 973333333 2920000000 2920000000
0.024 0.499 2.040E-03 796363636 2920000000 2920000000
0.025 0.499 2.270E-03 730000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.026 0.499 2.550E-03 625714286 2920000000 2920000000
0.027 0.499 2.900E-03 515294118 2920000000 2920000000
0.028 0.499 4.300E-04 4380000000 8760000000 8760000000
0.029 0.499 4.400E-04 4380000000 8760000000 8760000000
0.03 0.499 4.600E-04 4380000000 8760000000 8760000000
0.031 0.499 4.700E-04 4380000000 8760000000 8760000000
0.032 0.499 4.900E-04 4380000000 8760000000 8760000000
0.033 0.499 5.200E-04 4380000000 8760000000 8760000000
0.034 0.499 5.400E-04 4380000000 8760000000 8760000000
0.035 0.499 1.590E-03 1251428571 2920000000 2920000000
0.036 0.499 1.690E-03 1095000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.037 0.499 1.820E-03 973333333 2920000000 2920000000
0.038 0.499 1.980E-03 876000000 2920000000 2920000000
0.039 0.499 2.190E-03 796363636 2920000000 2920000000
0.04 0.499 2.500E-03 625714286 2920000000 2920000000
0.041 0.499 3.010E-03 515294118 2920000000 2920000000
0.042 0.499 4.090E-03 350400000 2920000000 2920000000
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0.043 0.499 7.410E-03 182500000 2920000000 2920000000
0.044 0.499 2.060E-03 673846154 8760000000 8760000000
0.045 0.499 1.112E-02 118378378 2920000000 2920000000
0.046 0.499 4.209E-02 29594595 8760000000 8760000000
0.047 0.498 4.343E+00 285444 8760000000 8760000000
0.048 0.497 1.054E+01 117587 2920000000 2920000000
0.049 0.496 1.661E+01 74610 8760000000 8760000000
0.05 0.495 2.259E+01 54883 2920000000 2920000000
0.051 0.494 2.843E+01 43601 2920000000 2920000000
0.052 0.493 3.417E+01 36276 2920000000 2920000000
0.053 0.492 3.981E+01 31138 2920000000 2920000000
0.054 0.491 4.535E+01 27334 2920000000 2920000000
0.055 0.490 5.079E+01 24405 2920000000 2920000000
0.056 0.489 5.614E+01 22079 2920000000 2920000000
0.057 0.488 6.140E+01 20187 2920000000 2920000000
0.058 0.487 6.658E+01 18617 2920000000 2920000000
0.059 0.486 7.167E+01 17294 2920000000 2920000000
0.06 0.486 7.669E+01 16164 2920000000 2920000000
0.061 0.485 8.162E+01 15187 2920000000 2920000000
0.062 0.484 8.648E+01 14333 2920000000 2920000000
0.063 0.483 9.127E+01 13581 2920000000 2920000000
0.064 0.483 9.599E+01 12914 2920000000 2920000000
0.065 0.482 1.006E+02 12317 2920000000 2920000000
0.066 0.481 1.052E+02 11781 2920000000 2920000000
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0.067 0.481 1.097E+02 11296 2920000000 2920000000
0.068 0.480 1.142E+02 10855 2920000000 2920000000
0.069 0.479 1.186E+02 10453 2920000000 2920000000
0.07 0.479 1.229E+02 10084 2920000000 2920000000
0.071 0.478 1.272E+02 9744 2920000000 2920000000
0.072 0.478 1.314E+02 9431 2920000000 2920000000
0.073 0.477 1.356E+02 9141 2920000000 2920000000
0.074 0.477 1.397E+02 8871 2920000000 2920000000
0.075 0.476 1.438E+02 8620 2190000000 2920000000
0.076 0.476 1.478E+02 8386 2190000000 2920000000
0.077 0.475 1.518E+02 8167 2190000000 2920000000
0.078 0.475 1.557E+02 7961 2190000000 2920000000
0.079 0.474 1.596E+02 7767 2190000000 2920000000
0.08 0.474 1.634E+02 7585 2190000000 2920000000
0.081 0.473 1.672E+02 7413 2190000000 2920000000
0.082 0.473 1.710E+02 7251 8760000000 8760000000
0.083 0.473 1.747E+02 7097 8760000000 8760000000
0.084 0.472 1.783E+02 6951 8760000000 8760000000
0.085 0.472 1.819E+02 6813 8760000000 8760000000
0.086 0.471 1.855E+02 6681 8760000000 8760000000
0.087 0.471 1.891E+02 6555 8760000000 8760000000
0.088 0.471 1.926E+02 6436 8760000000 8760000000
0.089 0.470 1.961E+02 6322 8760000000 8760000000
0.09 0.470 1.995E+02 6213 8760000000 8760000000
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0.091 0.470 2.029E+02 6108 8760000000 8760000000
0.092 0.469 2.063E+02 6008 8760000000 8760000000
0.093 0.469 2.096E+02 5913 8760000000 8760000000
0.094 0.469 2.130E+02 5821 8760000000 8760000000
0.095 0.468 2.162E+02 5733 8760000000 8760000000
0.096 0.468 2.195E+02 5648 8760000000 8760000000
0.097 0.468 2.227E+02 5566 8760000000 8760000000
0.098 0.467 2.259E+02 5488 4380000000 8760000000
0.099 0.467 2.290E+02 5412 4380000000 8760000000
0.1 0.467 2.322E+02 5339 4380000000 8760000000
0.101 0.467 2.353E+02 5268 4380000000 8760000000
0.102 0.466 2.384E+02 5200 4380000000 8760000000
0.103 0.466 2.414E+02 5135 4380000000 8760000000
0.104 0.466 2.444E+02 5071 4380000000 8760000000
0.105 0.466 2.474E+02 5010 4380000000 8760000000
0.106 0.465 2.504E+02 4950 4380000000 8760000000
0.107 0.465 2.533E+02 4893 4380000000 8760000000
0.108 0.465 2.563E+02 4837 4380000000 8760000000
0.109 0.465 2.592E+02 4783 4380000000 8760000000
0.11 0.464 2.620E+02 4730 4380000000 8760000000
0.111 0.464 2.649E+02 4679 4380000000 8760000000
0.112 0.464 2.677E+02 4630 4380000000 8760000000
0.113 0.464 2.705E+02 4582 4380000000 8760000000
0.114 0.463 2.733E+02 4535 4380000000 8760000000
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0.115 0.463 2.761E+02 4490 4380000000 8760000000
0.116 0.463 2.788E+02 4445 4380000000 8760000000
0.117 0.463 2.816E+02 4402 4380000000 8760000000
0.118 0.463 2.843E+02 4360 4380000000 8760000000
0.119 0.462 2.870E+02 4320 4380000000 8760000000
0.12 0.462 2.896E+02 4280 4380000000 8760000000
0.121 0.462 2.923E+02 4241 4380000000 8760000000
0.122 0.462 2.949E+02 4203 4380000000 8760000000
0.123 0.462 2.975E+02 4167 4380000000 8760000000
0.124 0.461 3.001E+02 4131 4380000000 8760000000
0.125 0.461 3.027E+02 4095 4380000000 8760000000
0.126 0.461 3.052E+02 4061 1460000000 2920000000
0.127 0.461 3.078E+02 4028 1460000000 2920000000
0.128 0.461 3.103E+02 3995 1460000000 2920000000
0.129 0.461 3.128E+02 3963 1460000000 2920000000
0.13 0.460 3.153E+02 3932 1460000000 2920000000
0.131 0.460 3.177E+02 3901 1460000000 2920000000
0.132 0.460 3.202E+02 3871 1460000000 2920000000
0.133 0.460 3.226E+02 3842 1460000000 2920000000
0.134 0.460 3.251E+02 3813 1460000000 2920000000
0.135 0.460 3.275E+02 3785 1251428571 2920000000
0.136 0.459 3.299E+02 3758 1251428571 2920000000
0.137 0.459 3.323E+02 3731 1251428571 2920000000
0.138 0.459 3.346E+02 3704 1251428571 2920000000
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0.139 0.459 3.370E+02 3678 1251428571 2190000000
0.14 0.459 3.393E+02 3653 1251428571 2190000000
0.141 0.459 3.416E+02 3628 1251428571 2190000000
0.142 0.459 3.439E+02 3604 1251428571 2190000000
0.143 0.458 3.462E+02 3580 1251428571 2190000000
0.144 0.458 3.485E+02 3557 1095000000 2190000000
0.145 0.458 3.508E+02 3534 1095000000 2190000000
0.146 0.458 3.530E+02 3511 1095000000 2190000000
0.147 0.458 3.553E+02 3489 1095000000 2190000000
0.148 0.458 3.575E+02 3467 1095000000 2190000000
0.149 0.458 3.597E+02 3446 1095000000 2190000000
0.15 0.458 3.619E+02 3425 1095000000 2190000000
0.151 0.457 3.641E+02 3404 973333333 2190000000
0.152 0.457 3.663E+02 3384 973333333 2190000000
0.153 0.457 3.685E+02 3364 973333333 2190000000
0.154 0.457 3.706E+02 3344 973333333 2190000000
0.155 0.457 3.728E+02 3325 973333333 2190000000
0.156 0.457 3.749E+02 3306 876000000 2190000000
0.157 0.457 3.771E+02 3287 876000000 2190000000
0.158 0.457 3.792E+02 3269 876000000 2190000000
0.159 0.456 3.813E+02 3251 876000000 2190000000
0.16 0.456 3.834E+02 3233 876000000 2190000000
0.161 0.456 3.854E+02 3216 796363636 2190000000
0.162 0.456 3.875E+02 3199 796363636 2190000000
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0.163 0.456 3.896E+02 3182 796363636 2190000000
0.164 0.456 3.916E+02 3165 730000000 2190000000
0.165 0.456 3.937E+02 3149 730000000 2190000000
0.166 0.456 3.957E+02 3133 730000000 2190000000
0.167 0.456 3.977E+02 3117 673846154 2190000000
0.168 0.455 3.997E+02 3101 673846154 2190000000
0.169 0.455 4.017E+02 3085 673846154 2190000000
0.17 0.455 4.037E+02 3070 625714286 2190000000
0.171 0.455 4.057E+02 3055 625714286 2190000000
0.172 0.455 4.077E+02 3040 584000000 2190000000
0.173 0.455 4.097E+02 3026 584000000 2190000000
0.174 0.455 4.116E+02 3011 547500000 2190000000
0.175 0.455 4.136E+02 2997 547500000 2190000000
0.176 0.455 4.155E+02 2983 515294118 2190000000
0.177 0.455 4.174E+02 2970 486666667 2190000000
0.178 0.455 4.193E+02 2956 486666667 2190000000
0.179 0.454 4.213E+02 2942 461052632 2190000000
0.18 0.454 4.232E+02 2929 438000000 2190000000
0.181 0.454 4.251E+02 2916 417142857 2190000000
0.182 0.454 4.269E+02 2903 398181818 2190000000
0.183 0.454 4.288E+02 2891 417142857 2190000000
0.184 0.454 4.307E+02 2878 380869565 2190000000
0.185 0.454 4.326E+02 2866 365000000 2190000000
0.186 0.454 4.344E+02 2853 350400000 2190000000
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0.187 0.454 4.363E+02 2841 336923077 2190000000
0.188 0.454 4.381E+02 2829 312857143 2190000000
0.189 0.454 4.399E+02 2818 292000000 2190000000
0.19 0.454 4.418E+02 2806 273750000 2190000000
0.191 0.453 4.436E+02 2794 257647059 2190000000
0.192 0.453 4.454E+02 2783 236756757 2190000000
0.193 0.453 4.472E+02 2772 224615385 2190000000
0.194 0.453 4.490E+02 2761 203720930 2190000000
0.195 0.453 4.508E+02 2750 190434783 2190000000
0.196 0.453 4.526E+02 2739 171764706 2190000000
0.197 0.453 4.544E+02 2728 156428571 2190000000
0.198 0.453 4.561E+02 2718 141290323 2190000000
0.199 0.453 4.579E+02 2707 126956522 2190000000
0.2 0.453 4.597E+02 2697 113766234 2190000000
0.201 0.453 4.614E+02 2687 100689655 2190000000
0.202 0.453 4.631E+02 2676 88484848 2190000000
0.203 0.453 4.649E+02 2666 76842105 2190000000
0.204 0.453 4.666E+02 2657 796363636 4380000000
0.205 0.452 4.683E+02 2647 730000000 4380000000
0.206 0.452 4.700E+02 2637 673846154 4380000000
0.207 0.452 4.718E+02 2628 625714286 4380000000
0.208 0.452 4.735E+02 2618 584000000 4380000000
0.209 0.452 4.752E+02 2609 547500000 4380000000
0.21 0.452 4.769E+02 2599 486666667 4380000000
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0.211 0.452 4.785E+02 2590 438000000 4380000000
0.212 0.452 4.802E+02 2581 143606557 2190000000
0.213 0.452 4.819E+02 2572 126956522 2190000000
0.214 0.452 4.836E+02 2563 109500000 2190000000
0.215 0.452 4.852E+02 2555 90309278 2190000000
0.216 0.452 4.869E+02 2546 67906977 2190000000
0.217 0.452 4.886E+02 2537 40183486 2190000000
0.218 0.452 4.903E+02 2529 13094170 1752000000
0.219 0.452 4.919E+02 2520 23485255 1752000000
0.22 0.452 4.935E+02 2512 15840868 4380000000
0.221 0.451 5.105E+02 2504 61218 4380000000
0.222 0.450 5.430E+02 2495 20371 1752000000
0.223 0.449 5.754E+02 2487 12226 1752000000
0.224 0.448 6.076E+02 2479 8747 1752000000
0.225 0.446 6.398E+02 2471 6813 1752000000
0.226 0.445 6.719E+02 2463 5582 1752000000
0.227 0.444 7.039E+02 2456 4729 1752000000
0.228 0.443 7.358E+02 2448 4105 1752000000
0.229 0.442 7.676E+02 2440 3627 1752000000
0.23 0.441 7.993E+02 2433 3250 1752000000
0.231 0.440 8.310E+02 2425 2945 4380000000
0.232 0.439 8.625E+02 2418 2692 4380000000
0.233 0.438 8.939E+02 2410 2481 4380000000
0.234 0.437 9.253E+02 2403 2300 4380000000
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0.235 0.436 9.566E+02 2396 2144 4380000000
0.236 0.435 9.877E+02 2388 2009 4380000000
0.237 0.434 1.019E+03 2381 1890 4380000000
0.238 0.433 1.050E+03 2374 1784 4380000000
0.239 0.432 1.081E+03 2367 1690 4380000000
0.24 0.431 1.112E+03 2360 1606 1752000000
0.241 0.430 1.142E+03 2353 1530 1752000000
0.242 0.429 1.173E+03 2347 1461 1752000000
0.243 0.428 1.204E+03 2340 1398 1752000000
0.244 0.427 1.234E+03 2333 1340 1752000000
0.245 0.426 1.265E+03 2326 1287 1752000000
0.246 0.425 1.295E+03 2320 1238 1752000000
0.247 0.424 1.325E+03 2313 1193 1752000000
0.248 0.423 1.355E+03 2307 1151 1752000000
0.249 0.422 1.385E+03 2300 1112 1752000000
0.25 0.421 1.415E+03 2294 1076 1752000000
0.251 0.421 1.445E+03 2288 1042 1752000000
0.252 0.420 1.475E+03 2281 1010 1752000000
0.253 0.419 1.505E+03 2275 981 1752000000
0.254 0.418 1.535E+03 2269 953 1752000000
0.255 0.417 1.564E+03 2263 926 1752000000
0.256 0.416 1.594E+03 2257 901 1752000000
0.257 0.415 1.624E+03 2251 878 1752000000
0.258 0.415 1.653E+03 2245 855 1752000000
158
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.259 0.414 1.682E+03 2239 834 1752000000
0.26 0.413 1.712E+03 2233 814 1752000000
0.261 0.412 1.741E+03 2227 795 1752000000
0.262 0.411 1.770E+03 2221 777 1752000000
0.263 0.410 1.799E+03 2216 760 1460000000
0.264 0.410 1.828E+03 2210 743 1460000000
0.265 0.409 1.857E+03 2204 727 1460000000
0.266 0.408 1.886E+03 2199 712 1460000000
0.267 0.407 1.915E+03 2193 698 1460000000
0.268 0.406 1.944E+03 2187 684 1460000000
0.269 0.406 1.972E+03 2182 671 1460000000
0.27 0.405 2.001E+03 2177 658 1460000000
0.271 0.404 2.030E+03 2171 646 1460000000
0.272 0.403 2.058E+03 2166 634 1460000000
0.273 0.403 2.087E+03 2160 622 1460000000
0.274 0.402 2.115E+03 2155 612 1460000000
0.275 0.401 2.143E+03 2150 601 1460000000
0.276 0.400 2.172E+03 2145 591 1460000000
0.277 0.400 2.200E+03 2139 581 1460000000
0.278 0.399 2.228E+03 2134 572 1460000000
0.279 0.398 2.256E+03 2129 563 1460000000
0.28 0.397 2.284E+03 2124 554 1460000000
0.281 0.397 2.312E+03 2119 545 1460000000
0.282 0.396 2.340E+03 2114 537 1460000000
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0.283 0.395 2.368E+03 2109 529 1460000000
0.284 0.394 2.396E+03 2104 521 1460000000
0.285 0.394 2.424E+03 2099 514 1460000000
0.286 0.393 2.451E+03 2094 506 1460000000
0.287 0.392 2.479E+03 2089 499 1460000000
0.288 0.392 2.507E+03 2085 493 1460000000
0.289 0.391 2.534E+03 2080 486 1460000000
0.29 0.390 2.562E+03 2075 479 1460000000
0.291 0.390 2.589E+03 2070 473 1460000000
0.292 0.389 2.616E+03 2066 467 1460000000
0.293 0.388 2.644E+03 2061 461 1460000000
0.294 0.388 2.671E+03 2056 455 1460000000
0.295 0.387 2.698E+03 2052 450 1460000000
0.296 0.386 2.726E+03 2047 444 1251428571
0.297 0.386 2.753E+03 2043 439 1251428571
0.298 0.385 2.780E+03 2038 434 1251428571
0.299 0.385 2.807E+03 2034 429 1251428571
0.3 0.384 2.834E+03 2029 424 1251428571
0.301 0.383 2.861E+03 2025 419 1251428571
0.302 0.383 2.888E+03 2020 414 1251428571
0.303 0.382 2.915E+03 2016 409 1251428571
0.304 0.381 2.941E+03 2012 405 1251428571
0.305 0.381 2.968E+03 2007 401 1251428571
0.306 0.380 2.995E+03 2003 396 1251428571
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0.307 0.380 3.022E+03 1999 392 1251428571
0.308 0.379 3.048E+03 1995 388 1251428571
0.309 0.378 3.075E+03 1990 384 1251428571
0.31 0.378 3.101E+03 1986 380 1251428571
0.311 0.377 3.128E+03 1982 376 1251428571
0.312 0.377 3.154E+03 1978 373 1251428571
0.313 0.376 3.181E+03 1974 369 1251428571
0.314 0.375 3.207E+03 1970 365 1251428571
0.315 0.375 3.234E+03 1966 362 1251428571
0.316 0.374 3.260E+03 1962 358 1251428571
0.317 0.374 3.286E+03 1958 355 1251428571
0.318 0.373 3.312E+03 1954 352 1251428571
0.319 0.373 3.338E+03 1950 348 1251428571
0.32 0.372 3.365E+03 1946 345 1095000000
0.321 0.371 3.391E+03 1942 342 1095000000
0.322 0.371 3.417E+03 1938 339 1095000000
0.323 0.370 3.443E+03 1934 336 1095000000
0.324 0.370 3.469E+03 1930 333 1095000000
0.325 0.369 3.495E+03 1926 330 1095000000
0.326 0.369 3.521E+03 1922 327 1095000000
0.327 0.368 3.547E+03 1919 325 1095000000
0.328 0.368 3.572E+03 1915 322 1095000000
0.329 0.367 3.598E+03 1911 319 1095000000
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0.33 0.367 3.624E+03 1907 317 1095000000
0.331 0.366 3.650E+03 1904 314 1095000000
0.332 0.366 3.675E+03 1900 312 1095000000
0.333 0.365 3.701E+03 1896 309 1095000000
0.334 0.365 3.727E+03 1893 307 1095000000
0.335 0.364 3.752E+03 1889 304 1095000000
0.336 0.364 3.778E+03 1885 302 1095000000
0.337 0.363 3.803E+03 1882 299 1095000000
0.338 0.363 3.829E+03 1878 297 1095000000
0.339 0.362 3.854E+03 1875 295 973333333
0.34 0.362 3.880E+03 1871 293 973333333
0.341 0.361 3.905E+03 1868 291 973333333
0.342 0.361 3.931E+03 1864 288 973333333
0.343 0.360 3.956E+03 1861 286 973333333
0.344 0.360 3.981E+03 1857 284 973333333
0.345 0.359 4.006E+03 1854 282 973333333
0.346 0.359 4.032E+03 1850 280 973333333
0.347 0.358 4.057E+03 1847 278 973333333
0.348 0.358 4.082E+03 1843 276 973333333
0.349 0.357 4.107E+03 1840 274 973333333
0.35 0.357 4.132E+03 1837 272 973333333
0.351 0.356 4.158E+03 1833 270 973333333
0.352 0.356 4.183E+03 1830 269 973333333
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0.353 0.355 4.208E+03 1827 267 876000000
0.354 0.355 4.233E+03 1823 265 876000000
0.355 0.354 4.258E+03 1820 263 876000000
0.356 0.354 4.283E+03 1817 262 876000000
0.357 0.354 4.308E+03 1814 260 876000000
0.358 0.353 4.333E+03 1810 258 876000000
0.359 0.353 4.357E+03 1807 256 876000000
0.36 0.352 4.382E+03 1804 255 876000000
0.361 0.352 4.407E+03 1801 253 876000000
0.362 0.351 4.432E+03 1798 252 876000000
0.363 0.351 4.457E+03 1794 250 876000000
0.364 0.350 4.481E+03 1791 249 796363636
0.365 0.350 4.506E+03 1788 247 796363636
0.366 0.350 4.531E+03 1785 245 796363636
0.367 0.349 4.556E+03 1782 244 796363636
0.368 0.349 4.580E+03 1779 242 796363636
0.369 0.348 4.605E+03 1776 241 796363636
0.37 0.348 4.630E+03 1773 240 796363636
0.371 0.348 4.654E+03 1770 238 796363636
0.372 0.347 4.679E+03 1767 237 796363636
0.373 0.347 4.703E+03 1764 235 796363636
0.374 0.346 4.728E+03 1761 234 730000000
0.375 0.346 4.752E+03 1758 233 730000000
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0.376 0.345 4.777E+03 1755 231 730000000
0.377 0.345 4.801E+03 1752 230 730000000
0.378 0.345 4.826E+03 1749 229 730000000
0.379 0.344 4.850E+03 1746 227 730000000
0.38 0.344 4.875E+03 1743 226 730000000
0.381 0.343 4.899E+03 1740 225 673846154
0.382 0.343 4.923E+03 1737 224 673846154
0.383 0.343 4.948E+03 1734 222 673846154
0.384 0.342 4.972E+03 1731 221 673846154
0.385 0.342 4.996E+03 1728 220 673846154
0.386 0.342 5.021E+03 1726 219 673846154
0.387 0.341 5.045E+03 1723 218 673846154
0.388 0.341 5.069E+03 1720 217 625714286
0.389 0.340 5.093E+03 1717 215 625714286
0.39 0.340 5.118E+03 1714 214 625714286
0.391 0.340 5.142E+03 1712 213 625714286
0.392 0.339 5.166E+03 1709 212 625714286
0.393 0.339 5.190E+03 1706 211 584000000
0.394 0.338 5.214E+03 1703 210 584000000
0.395 0.338 5.238E+03 1701 209 584000000
0.396 0.338 5.262E+03 1698 208 584000000
0.397 0.337 5.287E+03 1695 207 584000000
0.398 0.337 5.311E+03 1692 206 547500000
0.399 0.337 5.335E+03 1690 205 547500000
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0.4 0.336 5.359E+03 1687 204 547500000
0.401 0.336 5.383E+03 1684 203 547500000
0.402 0.336 5.407E+03 1682 202 547500000
0.403 0.335 5.431E+03 1679 201 515294118
0.404 0.335 5.455E+03 1676 200 515294118
0.405 0.334 5.479E+03 1674 199 515294118
0.406 0.334 5.503E+03 1671 198 486666667
0.407 0.334 5.527E+03 1668 197 486666667
0.408 0.333 5.551E+03 1666 196 486666667
0.409 0.333 5.575E+03 1663 195 486666667
0.41 0.333 5.599E+03 1661 194 461052632
0.411 0.332 5.623E+03 1658 193 461052632
0.412 0.332 5.646E+03 1656 192 547500000
0.413 0.332 5.670E+03 1653 191 547500000
0.414 0.331 5.694E+03 1650 191 547500000
0.415 0.331 5.718E+03 1648 190 515294118
0.416 0.331 5.742E+03 1645 189 1460000000
0.417 0.330 5.766E+03 1643 188 1460000000
0.418 0.330 5.790E+03 1640 187 1460000000
0.419 0.330 5.813E+03 1638 186 1460000000
0.42 0.329 5.837E+03 1635 185 1460000000
0.421 0.329 5.861E+03 1633 185 1251428571
0.422 0.329 5.885E+03 1630 184 1251428571
0.423 0.328 5.908E+03 1628 183 1251428571
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0.424 0.328 5.932E+03 1625 182 1251428571
0.425 0.328 5.956E+03 1623 181 461052632
0.426 0.327 5.980E+03 1621 181 461052632
0.427 0.327 6.004E+03 1618 180 438000000
0.428 0.327 6.027E+03 1616 179 438000000
0.429 0.326 6.051E+03 1613 178 438000000
0.43 0.326 6.075E+03 1611 178 417142857
0.431 0.326 6.098E+03 1609 177 417142857
0.432 0.326 6.122E+03 1606 176 398181818
0.433 0.325 6.146E+03 1604 175 398181818
0.434 0.325 6.169E+03 1601 175 398181818
0.435 0.325 6.193E+03 1599 174 380869565
0.436 0.324 6.217E+03 1597 173 380869565
0.437 0.324 6.240E+03 1594 172 365000000
0.438 0.324 6.264E+03 1592 172 365000000
0.439 0.323 6.288E+03 1590 171 350400000
0.44 0.323 6.311E+03 1587 170 350400000
0.441 0.323 6.335E+03 1585 170 336923077
0.442 0.323 6.359E+03 1583 169 336923077
0.443 0.322 6.382E+03 1581 168 324444444
0.444 0.322 6.406E+03 1578 168 324444444
0.445 0.322 6.430E+03 1576 167 312857143
0.446 0.321 6.453E+03 1574 166 302068966
0.447 0.321 6.477E+03 1571 166 302068966
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0.448 0.321 6.500E+03 1569 165 292000000
0.449 0.320 6.524E+03 1567 164 282580645
0.45 0.320 6.548E+03 1565 164 273750000
0.451 0.320 6.571E+03 1562 163 265454545
0.452 0.320 6.595E+03 1560 162 257647059
0.453 0.319 6.618E+03 1558 162 250285714
0.454 0.319 6.642E+03 1556 161 243333333
0.455 0.319 6.666E+03 1554 160 236756757
0.456 0.318 6.689E+03 1551 160 230526316
0.457 0.318 6.713E+03 1549 159 219000000
0.458 0.318 6.736E+03 1547 159 213658537
0.459 0.318 6.760E+03 1545 158 203720930
0.46 0.317 6.784E+03 1543 157 194666667
0.461 0.317 6.807E+03 1540 157 182500000
0.462 0.317 6.831E+03 1538 156 171764706
0.463 0.317 6.854E+03 1536 156 159272727
0.464 0.316 6.878E+03 1534 155 148474576
0.465 0.316 6.901E+03 1532 155 134769231
0.466 0.316 6.925E+03 1530 154 120000000
0.467 0.315 6.949E+03 1528 153 105542169
0.468 0.315 6.972E+03 1525 153 91250000
0.469 0.315 6.996E+03 1523 152 76173913
0.47 0.315 7.019E+03 1521 152 62127660
0.471 0.314 7.043E+03 1519 151 48938547
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0.472 0.314 7.066E+03 1517 151 37435897
0.473 0.314 7.090E+03 1515 150 312857143
0.474 0.314 7.114E+03 1513 150 292000000
0.475 0.313 7.137E+03 1511 149 273750000
0.476 0.313 7.161E+03 1509 149 250285714
0.477 0.313 7.184E+03 1507 148 84230769
0.478 0.313 7.208E+03 1505 148 76842105
0.479 0.312 7.231E+03 1503 147 68976378
0.48 0.312 7.255E+03 1501 146 60000000
0.481 0.312 7.279E+03 1499 146 49772727
0.482 0.312 7.302E+03 1496 145 36500000
0.483 0.311 7.326E+03 1494 145 21736973
0.484 0.311 7.350E+03 1492 144 9711752
0.485 0.311 7.373E+03 1490 144 73000000
0.486 0.310 7.397E+03 1488 143 18061856
0.487 0.310 7.420E+03 1486 143 5622593
0.488 0.310 7.444E+03 1484 142 4143803
0.489 0.310 7.477E+03 1482 142 97538
0.49 0.309 7.543E+03 1480 142 16996
0.491 0.308 7.610E+03 1478 141 9253
0.492 0.308 7.676E+03 1476 141 6361
0.493 0.307 7.743E+03 1475 140 4842
0.494 0.306 7.810E+03 1473 140 3912
0.495 0.306 7.876E+03 1471 139 3281
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0.496 0.305 7.943E+03 1469 139 2825
0.497 0.304 8.010E+03 1467 138 2480
0.498 0.304 8.077E+03 1465 138 2211
0.499 0.303 8.144E+03 1463 137 1994
0.5 0.302 8.210E+03 1461 137 1816
0.501 0.301 8.277E+03 1459 136 1667
0.502 0.301 8.344E+03 1457 136 1541
0.503 0.300 8.411E+03 1455 136 1432
0.504 0.300 8.478E+03 1453 135 1338
0.505 0.299 8.544E+03 1451 135 1255
0.506 0.298 8.611E+03 1449 134 1182
0.507 0.298 8.678E+03 1447 134 1117
0.508 0.297 8.745E+03 1446 133 1059
0.509 0.296 8.812E+03 1444 133 1007
0.51 0.296 8.879E+03 1442 133 959
0.511 0.295 8.946E+03 1440 132 916
0.512 0.294 9.013E+03 1438 132 876
0.513 0.294 9.079E+03 1436 131 840
0.514 0.293 9.146E+03 1434 131 807
0.515 0.292 9.213E+03 1432 130 776
0.516 0.292 9.280E+03 1431 130 747
0.517 0.291 9.347E+03 1429 130 721
0.518 0.291 9.414E+03 1427 129 696
0.519 0.290 9.481E+03 1425 129 673
169
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.52 0.289 9.548E+03 1423 128 651
0.521 0.289 9.615E+03 1421 128 631
0.522 0.288 9.683E+03 1420 128 612
0.523 0.287 9.750E+03 1418 127 594
0.524 0.287 9.817E+03 1416 127 577
0.525 0.286 9.884E+03 1414 126 561
0.526 0.286 9.951E+03 1412 126 546
0.527 0.285 1.002E+04 1410 126 532
0.528 0.284 1.009E+04 1409 125 518
0.529 0.284 1.015E+04 1407 125 505
0.53 0.283 1.022E+04 1405 125 493
0.531 0.283 1.029E+04 1403 124 481
0.532 0.282 1.035E+04 1401 124 470
0.533 0.281 1.042E+04 1400 123 459
0.534 0.281 1.049E+04 1398 123 449
0.535 0.280 1.056E+04 1396 123 440
0.536 0.280 1.062E+04 1394 122 430
0.537 0.279 1.069E+04 1393 122 421
0.538 0.279 1.076E+04 1391 122 413
0.539 0.278 1.083E+04 1389 121 404
0.54 0.277 1.089E+04 1387 121 396
0.541 0.277 1.096E+04 1386 121 389
0.542 0.276 1.103E+04 1384 120 381
0.543 0.276 1.110E+04 1382 120 374
170
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.544 0.275 1.116E+04 1380 119 368
0.545 0.275 1.123E+04 1379 119 361
0.546 0.274 1.130E+04 1377 119 355
0.547 0.273 1.137E+04 1375 118 348
0.548 0.273 1.144E+04 1373 118 343
0.549 0.272 1.150E+04 1372 118 337
0.55 0.272 1.157E+04 1370 117 331
0.551 0.271 1.164E+04 1368 117 326
0.552 0.271 1.171E+04 1367 117 321
0.553 0.270 1.178E+04 1365 116 316
0.554 0.270 1.184E+04 1363 116 311
0.555 0.269 1.191E+04 1361 116 306
0.556 0.268 1.198E+04 1360 115 301
0.557 0.268 1.205E+04 1358 115 297
0.558 0.267 1.212E+04 1356 115 293
0.559 0.267 1.218E+04 1355 114 288
0.56 0.266 1.225E+04 1353 114 284
0.561 0.266 1.232E+04 1351 114 280
0.562 0.265 1.239E+04 1350 113 277
0.563 0.265 1.246E+04 1348 113 273
0.564 0.264 1.253E+04 1346 113 269
0.565 0.264 1.259E+04 1345 112 266
0.566 0.263 1.266E+04 1343 112 262
0.567 0.263 1.273E+04 1341 112 259
171
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.568 0.262 1.280E+04 1340 112 255
0.569 0.261 1.287E+04 1338 111 252
0.57 0.261 1.294E+04 1336 111 249
0.571 0.260 1.301E+04 1335 111 246
0.572 0.260 1.308E+04 1333 110 243
0.573 0.259 1.314E+04 1331 110 240
0.574 0.259 1.321E+04 1330 110 237
0.575 0.258 1.328E+04 1328 109 234
0.576 0.258 1.335E+04 1327 109 232
0.577 0.257 1.342E+04 1325 109 229
0.578 0.257 1.349E+04 1323 108 226
0.579 0.256 1.356E+04 1322 108 224
0.58 0.256 1.363E+04 1320 108 221
0.581 0.255 1.370E+04 1318 108 219
0.582 0.255 1.377E+04 1317 107 216
0.583 0.254 1.384E+04 1315 107 214
0.584 0.254 1.391E+04 1314 107 212
0.585 0.253 1.397E+04 1312 106 210
0.586 0.253 1.404E+04 1310 106 207
0.587 0.252 1.411E+04 1309 106 205
0.588 0.252 1.418E+04 1307 106 203
0.589 0.251 1.425E+04 1306 105 201
0.59 0.251 1.432E+04 1304 105 199
0.591 0.250 1.439E+04 1302 105 197
172
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.592 0.250 1.446E+04 1301 104 195
0.593 0.249 1.453E+04 1299 104 193
0.594 0.249 1.460E+04 1298 104 191
0.595 0.249 1.467E+04 1296 104 189
0.596 0.248 1.474E+04 1294 103 188
0.597 0.248 1.481E+04 1293 103 186
0.598 0.247 1.489E+04 1291 103 184
0.599 0.247 1.496E+04 1290 102 182
0.6 0.246 1.503E+04 1288 102 181
0.601 0.246 1.510E+04 1287 102 179
0.602 0.245 1.517E+04 1285 102 177
0.603 0.245 1.524E+04 1284 101 176
0.604 0.244 1.531E+04 1282 101 174
0.605 0.244 1.538E+04 1280 101 173
0.606 0.243 1.545E+04 1279 101 171
0.607 0.243 1.552E+04 1277 100 170
0.608 0.242 1.559E+04 1276 100 168
0.609 0.242 1.566E+04 1274 100 167
0.61 0.242 1.574E+04 1273 100 165
0.611 0.241 1.581E+04 1271 99 164
0.612 0.241 1.588E+04 1270 99 162
0.613 0.240 1.595E+04 1268 99 161
0.614 0.240 1.602E+04 1267 98 160
0.615 0.239 1.609E+04 1265 98 158
173
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.616 0.239 1.617E+04 1263 98 157
0.617 0.238 1.624E+04 1262 98 156
0.618 0.238 1.631E+04 1260 97 155
0.619 0.237 1.638E+04 1259 97 153
0.62 0.237 1.645E+04 1257 97 152
0.621 0.237 1.653E+04 1256 97 151
0.622 0.236 1.660E+04 1254 96 150
0.623 0.236 1.667E+04 1253 96 149
0.624 0.235 1.674E+04 1251 96 147
0.625 0.235 1.682E+04 1250 96 146
0.626 0.234 1.689E+04 1248 95 145
0.627 0.234 1.696E+04 1247 95 144
0.628 0.234 1.703E+04 1245 95 143
0.629 0.233 1.711E+04 1244 95 142
0.63 0.233 1.718E+04 1242 94 141
0.631 0.232 1.725E+04 1241 94 140
0.632 0.232 1.733E+04 1239 94 139
0.633 0.231 1.740E+04 1238 94 138
0.634 0.231 1.747E+04 1236 94 137
0.635 0.231 1.755E+04 1235 93 136
0.636 0.230 1.762E+04 1233 93 135
0.637 0.230 1.769E+04 1232 93 134
0.638 0.229 1.777E+04 1230 93 133
0.639 0.229 1.784E+04 1229 92 132
174
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.64 0.228 1.792E+04 1227 92 131
0.641 0.228 1.799E+04 1226 92 130
0.642 0.228 1.806E+04 1224 92 129
0.643 0.227 1.814E+04 1223 91 128
0.644 0.227 1.821E+04 1221 91 128
0.645 0.226 1.829E+04 1220 91 127
0.646 0.226 1.836E+04 1219 91 126
0.647 0.226 1.844E+04 1217 90 125
0.648 0.225 1.851E+04 1216 90 124
0.649 0.225 1.859E+04 1214 90 123
0.65 0.224 1.866E+04 1213 90 123
0.651 0.224 1.874E+04 1211 90 122
0.652 0.224 1.881E+04 1210 89 121
0.653 0.223 1.889E+04 1208 89 120
0.654 0.223 1.897E+04 1207 89 119
0.655 0.222 1.904E+04 1205 89 119
0.656 0.222 1.912E+04 1204 88 118
0.657 0.222 1.919E+04 1202 88 117
0.658 0.221 1.927E+04 1201 88 116
0.659 0.221 1.935E+04 1200 88 116
0.66 0.220 1.942E+04 1198 88 115
0.661 0.220 1.950E+04 1197 87 114
0.662 0.220 1.958E+04 1195 87 113
0.663 0.219 1.965E+04 1194 87 113
175
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.664 0.219 1.973E+04 1192 87 112
0.665 0.218 1.981E+04 1191 86 111
0.666 0.218 1.988E+04 1189 86 111
0.667 0.218 1.996E+04 1188 86 110
0.668 0.217 2.004E+04 1187 86 109
0.669 0.217 2.012E+04 1185 86 109
0.67 0.216 2.019E+04 1184 85 108
0.671 0.216 2.027E+04 1182 85 107
0.672 0.216 2.035E+04 1181 85 107
0.673 0.215 2.043E+04 1179 85 106
0.674 0.215 2.051E+04 1178 84 105
0.675 0.215 2.059E+04 1177 84 105
0.676 0.214 2.066E+04 1175 84 104
0.677 0.214 2.074E+04 1174 84 104
0.678 0.213 2.082E+04 1172 84 103
0.679 0.213 2.090E+04 1171 83 102
0.68 0.213 2.098E+04 1169 83 102
0.681 0.212 2.106E+04 1168 83 101
0.682 0.212 2.114E+04 1167 83 101
0.683 0.212 2.122E+04 1165 83 100
0.684 0.211 2.130E+04 1164 82 100
0.685 0.211 2.138E+04 1162 82 99
0.686 0.210 2.146E+04 1161 82 98
0.687 0.210 2.154E+04 1160 82 98
176
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.688 0.210 2.162E+04 1158 82 97
0.689 0.209 2.170E+04 1157 81 97
0.69 0.209 2.178E+04 1155 81 96
0.691 0.209 2.186E+04 1154 81 96
0.692 0.208 2.194E+04 1152 81 95
0.693 0.208 2.203E+04 1151 81 95
0.694 0.208 2.211E+04 1150 80 94
0.695 0.207 2.219E+04 1148 80 94
0.696 0.207 2.227E+04 1147 80 93
0.697 0.206 2.235E+04 1145 80 93
0.698 0.206 2.244E+04 1144 80 92
0.699 0.206 2.252E+04 1143 79 92
0.7 0.205 2.260E+04 1141 79 91
0.701 0.205 2.268E+04 1140 79 91
0.702 0.205 2.277E+04 1138 79 90
0.703 0.204 2.285E+04 1137 79 90
0.704 0.204 2.293E+04 1136 78 89
0.705 0.204 2.302E+04 1134 78 89
0.706 0.203 2.310E+04 1133 78 88
0.707 0.203 2.319E+04 1131 78 88
0.708 0.203 2.327E+04 1130 78 87
0.709 0.202 2.335E+04 1129 77 87
0.71 0.202 2.344E+04 1127 77 86
0.711 0.202 2.352E+04 1126 77 86
177
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.712 0.201 2.361E+04 1124 77 86
0.713 0.201 2.369E+04 1123 77 85
0.714 0.200 2.378E+04 1122 76 85
0.715 0.200 2.387E+04 1120 76 84
0.716 0.200 2.395E+04 1119 76 84
0.717 0.199 2.404E+04 1117 76 83
0.718 0.199 2.412E+04 1116 76 83
0.719 0.199 2.421E+04 1115 75 83
0.72 0.198 2.430E+04 1113 75 82
0.721 0.198 2.438E+04 1112 75 82
0.722 0.198 2.447E+04 1110 75 81
0.723 0.197 2.456E+04 1109 75 81
0.724 0.197 2.465E+04 1108 74 81
0.725 0.197 2.473E+04 1106 74 80
0.726 0.196 2.482E+04 1105 74 80
0.727 0.196 2.491E+04 1104 74 79
0.728 0.196 2.500E+04 1102 74 79
0.729 0.195 2.509E+04 1101 73 79
0.73 0.195 2.518E+04 1099 73 78
0.731 0.195 2.527E+04 1098 73 78
0.732 0.194 2.536E+04 1097 73 77
0.733 0.194 2.545E+04 1095 73 77
0.734 0.194 2.554E+04 1094 73 77
0.735 0.193 2.563E+04 1092 72 76
178
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.736 0.193 2.572E+04 1091 72 76
0.737 0.193 2.581E+04 1090 72 76
0.738 0.192 2.590E+04 1088 72 75
0.739 0.192 2.599E+04 1087 72 75
0.74 0.192 2.608E+04 1086 71 75
0.741 0.192 2.618E+04 1084 71 74
0.742 0.191 2.627E+04 1083 71 74
0.743 0.191 2.636E+04 1081 71 73
0.744 0.191 2.645E+04 1080 71 73
0.745 0.190 2.655E+04 1079 70 73
0.746 0.190 2.664E+04 1077 70 72
0.747 0.190 2.674E+04 1076 70 72
0.748 0.189 2.683E+04 1074 70 72
0.749 0.189 2.692E+04 1073 70 71
0.75 0.189 2.702E+04 1072 70 71
0.751 0.188 2.711E+04 1070 69 71
0.752 0.188 2.721E+04 1069 69 70
0.753 0.188 2.730E+04 1067 69 70
0.754 0.187 2.740E+04 1066 69 70
0.755 0.187 2.750E+04 1065 69 69
0.756 0.187 2.759E+04 1063 68 69
0.757 0.186 2.769E+04 1062 68 69
0.758 0.186 2.779E+04 1061 68 69
0.759 0.186 2.789E+04 1059 68 68
179
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.76 0.186 2.798E+04 1058 68 68
0.761 0.185 2.808E+04 1056 68 68
0.762 0.185 2.818E+04 1055 67 67
0.763 0.185 2.828E+04 1054 67 67
0.764 0.184 2.838E+04 1052 67 67
0.765 0.184 2.848E+04 1051 67 66
0.766 0.184 2.858E+04 1049 67 66
0.767 0.183 2.868E+04 1048 66 66
0.768 0.183 2.878E+04 1047 66 65
0.769 0.183 2.888E+04 1045 66 65
0.77 0.182 2.898E+04 1044 66 65
0.771 0.182 2.908E+04 1042 66 65
0.772 0.182 2.919E+04 1041 66 64
0.773 0.182 2.929E+04 1040 65 64
0.774 0.181 2.939E+04 1038 65 64
0.775 0.181 2.950E+04 1037 65 63
0.776 0.181 2.960E+04 1036 65 63
0.777 0.180 2.970E+04 1034 65 63
0.778 0.180 2.981E+04 1033 64 63
0.779 0.180 2.991E+04 1031 64 62
0.78 0.179 3.002E+04 1030 64 62
0.781 0.179 3.013E+04 1029 64 62
0.782 0.179 3.023E+04 1027 64 62
0.783 0.179 3.034E+04 1026 64 61
180
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.784 0.178 3.045E+04 1024 63 61
0.785 0.178 3.055E+04 1023 63 61
0.786 0.178 3.066E+04 1022 63 60
0.787 0.177 3.077E+04 1020 63 60
0.788 0.177 3.088E+04 1019 63 60
0.789 0.177 3.099E+04 1017 62 60
0.79 0.176 3.110E+04 1016 62 59
0.791 0.176 3.121E+04 1014 62 59
0.792 0.176 3.132E+04 1013 62 59
0.793 0.176 3.143E+04 1012 62 59
0.794 0.175 3.155E+04 1010 62 58
0.795 0.175 3.166E+04 1009 61 58
0.796 0.175 3.177E+04 1007 61 58
0.797 0.174 3.189E+04 1006 61 58
0.798 0.174 3.200E+04 1005 61 57
0.799 0.174 3.212E+04 1003 61 57
0.8 0.174 3.223E+04 1002 60 57
0.801 0.173 3.235E+04 1000 60 57
0.802 0.173 3.246E+04 999 60 56
0.803 0.173 3.258E+04 997 60 56
0.804 0.172 3.270E+04 996 60 56
0.805 0.172 3.282E+04 995 60 56
0.806 0.172 3.293E+04 993 59 55
0.807 0.172 3.305E+04 992 59 55
181
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.808 0.171 3.317E+04 990 59 55
0.809 0.171 3.329E+04 989 59 55
0.81 0.171 3.342E+04 987 59 54
0.811 0.170 3.354E+04 986 58 54
0.812 0.170 3.366E+04 985 58 54
0.813 0.170 3.378E+04 983 58 54
0.814 0.170 3.391E+04 982 58 53
0.815 0.169 3.403E+04 980 58 53
0.816 0.169 3.416E+04 979 58 53
0.817 0.169 3.428E+04 977 57 53
0.818 0.168 3.441E+04 976 57 53
0.819 0.168 3.454E+04 975 57 52
0.82 0.168 3.466E+04 973 57 52
0.821 0.168 3.479E+04 972 57 52
0.822 0.167 3.492E+04 970 56 52
0.823 0.167 3.505E+04 969 56 51
0.824 0.167 3.518E+04 967 56 51
0.825 0.166 3.532E+04 966 56 51
0.826 0.166 3.545E+04 964 56 51
0.827 0.166 3.558E+04 963 56 51
0.828 0.166 3.572E+04 961 55 50
0.829 0.165 3.585E+04 960 55 50
0.83 0.165 3.599E+04 958 55 50
0.831 0.165 3.612E+04 957 55 50
182
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.832 0.164 3.626E+04 955 55 49
0.833 0.164 3.640E+04 954 54 49
0.834 0.164 3.654E+04 953 54 49
0.835 0.164 3.668E+04 951 54 49
0.836 0.163 3.682E+04 950 54 49
0.837 0.163 3.696E+04 948 54 48
0.838 0.163 3.711E+04 947 53 48
0.839 0.163 3.725E+04 945 53 48
0.84 0.162 3.740E+04 944 53 48
0.841 0.162 3.754E+04 942 53 48
0.842 0.162 3.769E+04 941 53 47
0.843 0.161 3.784E+04 939 53 47
0.844 0.161 3.799E+04 938 52 47
0.845 0.161 3.814E+04 936 52 47
0.846 0.161 3.829E+04 935 52 47
0.847 0.160 3.844E+04 933 52 46
0.848 0.160 3.860E+04 932 52 46
0.849 0.160 3.875E+04 930 51 46
0.85 0.159 3.891E+04 928 51 46
0.851 0.159 3.907E+04 927 51 45
0.852 0.159 3.922E+04 925 51 45
0.853 0.159 3.938E+04 924 51 45
0.854 0.158 3.955E+04 922 50 45
0.855 0.158 3.971E+04 921 50 45
183
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.856 0.158 3.987E+04 919 50 45
0.857 0.158 4.004E+04 918 50 44
0.858 0.157 4.021E+04 916 50 44
0.859 0.157 4.038E+04 915 49 44
0.86 0.157 4.055E+04 913 49 44
0.861 0.156 4.072E+04 911 49 44
0.862 0.156 4.089E+04 910 49 43
0.863 0.156 4.106E+04 908 49 43
0.864 0.156 4.124E+04 907 48 43
0.865 0.155 4.142E+04 905 48 43
0.866 0.155 4.160E+04 903 48 43
0.867 0.155 4.178E+04 902 48 42
0.868 0.154 4.196E+04 900 48 42
0.869 0.154 4.215E+04 899 47 42
0.87 0.154 4.234E+04 897 47 42
0.871 0.154 4.253E+04 895 47 42
0.872 0.153 4.272E+04 894 47 41
0.873 0.153 4.291E+04 892 46 41
0.874 0.153 4.311E+04 891 46 41
0.875 0.153 4.330E+04 889 46 41
0.876 0.152 4.350E+04 887 46 41
0.877 0.152 4.371E+04 886 46 40
0.878 0.152 4.391E+04 884 45 40
0.879 0.151 4.412E+04 882 45 40
184
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.88 0.151 4.433E+04 881 45 40
0.881 0.151 4.454E+04 879 45 40
0.882 0.151 4.475E+04 877 44 40
0.883 0.150 4.497E+04 876 44 39
0.884 0.150 4.519E+04 874 44 39
0.885 0.150 4.542E+04 872 44 39
0.886 0.149 4.564E+04 871 44 39
0.887 0.149 4.587E+04 869 43 39
0.888 0.149 4.610E+04 867 43 38
0.889 0.148 4.634E+04 866 43 38
0.89 0.148 4.658E+04 864 43 38
0.891 0.148 4.682E+04 862 42 38
0.892 0.148 4.707E+04 860 42 38
0.893 0.147 4.732E+04 859 42 38
0.894 0.147 4.758E+04 857 42 37
0.895 0.147 4.784E+04 855 41 37
0.896 0.146 4.810E+04 853 41 37
0.897 0.146 4.837E+04 852 41 37
0.898 0.146 4.865E+04 850 40 37
0.899 0.145 4.893E+04 848 40 36
0.9 0.145 4.921E+04 846 40 36
0.901 0.145 4.950E+04 844 40 36
0.902 0.144 4.980E+04 843 39 36
0.903 0.144 5.010E+04 841 39 36
185
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.904 0.144 5.041E+04 839 39 36
0.905 0.143 5.072E+04 837 38 35
0.906 0.143 5.105E+04 835 38 35
0.907 0.143 5.138E+04 833 38 35
0.908 0.142 5.172E+04 832 38 35
0.909 0.142 5.206E+04 830 37 35
0.91 0.142 5.242E+04 828 37 34
0.911 0.141 5.279E+04 826 37 34
0.912 0.141 5.317E+04 824 36 34
0.913 0.141 5.356E+04 822 36 34
0.914 0.140 5.396E+04 820 36 34
0.915 0.140 5.437E+04 818 35 34
0.916 0.139 5.480E+04 816 35 33
0.917 0.139 5.525E+04 814 34 33
0.918 0.139 5.571E+04 812 34 33
0.919 0.138 5.620E+04 810 34 33
0.92 0.138 5.670E+04 808 33 33
0.921 0.137 5.723E+04 806 33 33
0.922 0.137 5.778E+04 804 32 32
0.923 0.136 5.836E+04 802 32 32
0.924 0.136 5.898E+04 800 31 32
0.925 0.135 5.963E+04 798 31 32
0.926 0.135 6.033E+04 796 30 32
0.927 0.134 6.108E+04 794 30 31
186
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.928 0.134 6.188E+04 792 29 31
0.929 0.133 6.276E+04 790 29 31
0.93 0.132 6.371E+04 787 28 31
0.931 0.131 6.476E+04 785 27 31
0.932 0.130 6.592E+04 783 26 31
0.933 0.130 6.723E+04 781 26 30
0.934 0.128 6.870E+04 779 25 30
0.935 0.127 7.038E+04 776 24 30
0.936 0.126 7.229E+04 774 23 30
0.937 0.125 7.447E+04 772 22 30
0.938 0.123 7.691E+04 770 21 29
0.939 0.121 7.962E+04 767 20 29
0.94 0.119 8.255E+04 765 19 29
0.941 0.117 8.567E+04 763 18 29
0.942 0.115 8.893E+04 760 17 29
0.943 0.113 9.231E+04 758 16 29
0.944 0.111 9.578E+04 755 15 28
0.945 0.109 9.933E+04 753 14 28
0.946 0.107 1.029E+05 750 13 28
0.947 0.105 1.066E+05 748 13 28
0.948 0.103 1.104E+05 745 12 28
0.949 0.101 1.142E+05 743 12 27
0.95 0.099 1.181E+05 740 11 27
0.951 0.097 1.221E+05 738 11 27
187
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.952 0.094 1.262E+05 735 10 27
0.953 0.092 1.303E+05 732 10 27
0.954 0.090 1.345E+05 730 9 26
0.955 0.088 1.389E+05 727 9 26
0.956 0.086 1.433E+05 724 9 26
0.957 0.084 1.478E+05 721 8 26
0.958 0.082 1.524E+05 718 8 26
0.959 0.080 1.571E+05 715 8 25
0.96 0.078 1.619E+05 712 8 25
0.961 0.076 1.668E+05 709 7 25
0.962 0.074 1.719E+05 706 7 25
0.963 0.072 1.771E+05 703 7 25
0.964 0.070 1.824E+05 700 7 24
0.965 0.068 1.879E+05 697 6 24
0.966 0.066 1.935E+05 694 6 24
0.967 0.064 1.993E+05 690 6 24
0.968 0.062 2.052E+05 687 6 24
0.969 0.060 2.114E+05 683 5 23
0.97 0.058 2.177E+05 680 5 23
0.971 0.056 2.243E+05 676 5 23
0.972 0.054 2.310E+05 672 5 23
0.973 0.052 2.380E+05 669 5 22
0.974 0.050 2.453E+05 665 5 22
0.975 0.048 2.528E+05 661 4 22
188
alpha risk cost, $/yr T1, h T2, h T3, h
0.976 0.046 2.607E+05 657 4 22
0.977 0.044 2.688E+05 652 4 21
0.978 0.042 2.773E+05 648 4 21
0.979 0.040 2.862E+05 644 4 21
0.98 0.038 2.956E+05 639 4 21
0.981 0.036 3.054E+05 634 4 20
0.982 0.034 3.157E+05 629 3 20
0.983 0.032 3.266E+05 624 3 20
0.984 0.030 3.381E+05 619 3 20
0.985 0.029 3.504E+05 613 3 19
0.986 0.027 3.635E+05 607 3 19
0.987 0.025 3.776E+05 601 3 19
0.988 0.023 3.928E+05 594 3 18
0.989 0.021 4.093E+05 587 3 18
0.99 0.019 4.273E+05 580 3 18
0.991 0.017 4.472E+05 572 2 17
0.992 0.015 4.695E+05 563 2 17
0.993 0.013 4.947E+05 554 2 16
0.994 0.011 5.237E+05 543 2 16
0.995 0.009 5.581E+05 531 2 15
0.996 0.008 6.001E+05 517 2 15
0.997 0.006 6.541E+05 500 2 14
0.998 0.004 7.303E+05 478 1 13
0.999 0.002 8.603E+05 445 1 12
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